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This dissertation explores two basic hypotheses about how humans make
decisions when presented with a sequential series of options: 1) people have a desire to
learn about or experience qualities of the set of options available to them and will delay
choice to gain such knowledge; and 2) delaying decision-making in order to better
understand the set of options available will lead to better know ledge of the distribution of
potential options and better decision outcomes. Three studies, conducted on a total of 302
college student participants, used an "optimal stopping" paradigm, in which participants
viewed a series of options (in Studies 1 and 2, the options determined how their time
would be spent in the latter part of the study; in Study 3, the options represented qualities
of a hypothetical potential housemate). Participants bad to choose or reject each in turn. I
vshow consistent support for two hypothesis: Decision-makers continue to view and
review options in order to gain a better understanding of the distribution of potential
options, and decision-makers who have a better understanding of the option space end up
with higher-quality decisions, using objective, subjective, and revealed-preference
measures of quality. These results were consistent for multi-attribute decisions, single-
attribute decisions, hypothetical decisions, and non-hypothetical decisions using both
within-subjects and between-subjects designs. Individual differences among decision-
makers did not show any consistent individual difference results, though decision-makers
higher in numeracy appear to make better use of the cues available to them. In sum,
decision-making appears to be aided by understanding the distribution of options,
suggesting that it is occasionally wise to delay or "procrastinate" choice in order to gain
an understanding of potential options when choosing.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine one reason why people delay
making decisions. Specifically, I hypothesize that one reason why people put off
choosing is to gain an understanding of the distribution of options potentially available to
them (gaining distributional information is desirable), and that gaining and using this
information will lead to better decision-making processes (having distribution
information, and delaying choice in order to gain such information, is useful).
The three studies described here are designed to explore the way in which people
make decisions in contexts in which options are presented in series and an accept/reject
decision must be made for each item. The studies will examine how decision-makers
differ in both the strategies they use and the outcomes they receive for these kinds of
decisions. These kinds of decisions are found frequently in real-world scenarios. For
example, imagine choosing a roommate: Usually each potential roommate "interviews,"
one at a time, and the search ends when one roommate is chosen. When the decision-
maker says "no" or "\ve'll call you later" to a potential roommate, there is a very real
chance that the option will disappear-the applicant needs somewhere to live, and is
certainly looking at other places.
2The roommate scenario is a good illustration of the phenomenon this dissertation
will explore for other reasons as well. There are, ofcourse, many qualities of a roommate
that bear evaluation--does the roommate seem personable? Does he have the means to
pay rent reliably? Is she sufficiently clean? When a roommate search begins, most people
are able to list desirable qualities of such a roommate, but they may not be in a position to
"hold out" for the perfect candidate: If the person with the room to rent deliberates or
interviews for too long, it could result in having to pay rent on an empty room, though
taking the first applicant to walk through the door could result in many other problems.
However, if one has not searched for a roommate before, or perhaps has not before
searched for a roommate in a particular town or for a particular dwelling, it is not always
clear exactly what one should or could reasonably hold out for. If the applicant is
unlikable and unemployed, the "reject" decision may be easy, but if a perfectly average
fellow applied, without knowledge of the pool ofpotential roommates, the decision-
maker might well wonder whether one could do better. When a second applicant arrives,
however, the two can be judged relative to each other-who is more likeable, who more
financially solvent? After interviewing a few more individuals, the person with the room
to rent may start to form an idea of the distribution of available candidates, and thus be
able to better evaluate individuals within that context-and also able to estimate how
likely it is that searching for longer will get somebody better than the candidate at hand,
or a candidate of a certain quality. This decision process, broadly speaking, is referred to
as an "optimal stopping" or "optional stopping" decision (Shaklee, 1958)--decision-
makers may stop viewing options whenever they like, by making a choice. As each
3option is reviewed, the choice (thus stopping) is "optional," and the decision-maker's
task is to discover when it is "optimal" to stop.
Delaying a decision in order to learn the distribution is unique in that it presents a
case where delaying choice may be wise. Learning what counts as a "good" choice may
prevent the decision-maker from making a sub-optimal choice. Learning the distribution
places decisions in context: In many real-world decisions made in the course of everyday
life, some background knowledge exists regarding not only the options among which a
decision-maker chooses, but also regarding the entire population of options. The purpose
of this dissertation is to show that gaining this knowledge is both desirable and useful,
and constitutes a wise reason for delaying choice.
Prior Work
This project ties together research from social, cognitive, quantitative, and
personality psychology. This section will first review the literature on "optional stopping"
paradigms, as that is the primary methodology used in the studies to follow. I will then
cover research on delaying action in general (which is mainly research on
procrastination), research on decisional procrastination specifically, and then individual
differences that may be related to delaying action and choice.
Optimal Stopping
ft,..n optimal stopping problem is a problem \:lJhere it is lL11clear \vhen it is "optima}"
to "stop." In the most commonly studied optimal stopping problem, called the "secretary
problem," decision-makers are told that they need to hire a secretary, but that they are
4very busy and very picky: Only the very best secretary will do (anyone but the best is
useless), and they will spent one afternoon interviewing secretaries, making a choice to
hire or reject each secretary interviewed in turn. In other words, the goal is to interview
and reject secretaries until the one thought to be "the best" has been found. At this point,
the hire is made, and all secretaries hypothetically waiting in the lobby for their interview
are sent home (Ferguson, 1989). Optimal stopping problems are also sometimes called
"optional" stopping problems, because though the task is to discover when it is optimal to
stop, " ...the subject has the option of waiting" (Corbin, 1980, p. 54, emphasis added).
While optimal stopping problems were not originally designed to study decision
delay per se, the paradigm is ideal for doing so: At each point in the problem, participants
can either choose an option or delay longer. Using hierarchical modeling techniques not
available when most research into optimal stopping was conducted, I will look at
qualities such as participants' subjective ratings of the option and relative qualities of the
option (for example, whether a given option is part of a positive or negative slope, and
whether it is "good" relative to other options seen so far), as variates affecting the
likelihood of choice.
The original "secretary problem" serves as the paradigm most frequently used to
study optimal stopping. A problem is considered to be a "secretary problem" if it follows
six basic assumptions (Ferguson, 1989); optimal stopping problems in general tend to
follow the Sfu"11e set. The studies in this dissertation more or less resemble a "secretary
problem" and thus I review these assumptions here (using "secretary problem" notation),
5and note how and when the current studies deviate from them. Assumptions are quoted
from Ferguson (1989, p. 282):
1) "There is only one secretarial position available." My thesis retains this
assumption, as there are many real-world situations in which there is only one choice that
can be made.
2) "The number n of applicants is known." My studies retain this assumption,
though I note that in many cases the precise number n is not known: For example, in a
roommate search, the decision-makers may not have knowledge of how many people will
be looking for rooms, but they likely know when rent is due and about how frequently
new roommate options appear.
3) "The applicants are interviewed sequentially in random order, each order being
equally likely." In the real world, options may get better or worse over time, and the
literature shows that people are sensitive to improving or worsening option sets (Corbin,
Olson, & Abbondanza, 1975; Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Hsee, Salovey, & Abelson, 1994),
so I retain this assumption.
4) "It is assumed that you can rank all ofthe applicants from best to worst without
ties. The decision to accept or reject an applicant must be based only on the relative ranks
of those applicants interviewed so far." In the real world, "ties" are indeed possible.
When choosing which plane ticket to buy online, one might see the same "best ticket" for
two days in a row. Further, most hard decisions are ones in which there are multiple
dimensions of quality, such as weighing the personability of a potential roommate against
6her financial stability (Yates, Venoitt, & Patalano, 2003), leading to ties when one
dimension for one option perfectly (or stochastically) balances out another dimension in
another option. Many financial decisions lead to ties whenever the payoffs (or expected
utilities, or expected values) are equivalent. Further, making decisions based on solely
relative ranks is often not a reasonable assumption for the real world, in which we may
have objective points of comparison-we may evaluate potential housemates relative to a
prior housemate, or to our notion of what's "best" or "unacceptable:" If the best applicant
out of 100 interviewed is still someone with whom we do not get along, a decision to
reject this individual would indeed be due to objective quality rather than relative rank.
As I am not trying to derive a normative strategy, this assumption is not directly relevant
to my studies, though my paradigms may at times assign the same value to more than one
option, or allow participants to do so (see Methods for Study 1, below).
5) "An applicant once rejected cannot later be recalled." In some real-world cases,
it may be possible to "recall" an option (e.g., to tell an applicant "we'll call you back
later," understanding that the applicant might find another job before a final decision
about whom to hire is made). I retain this assumption for these studies, but note that
future work should include an exploration of decisions for which this assumption is
violated.
6) "You are very particular and will be satisfied with nothing but the very best.
(That is, your payoff is 1 ifyoli choose the best of the n applicants and 0 otherwise)."
This assumption, couched at the end of the problem statement and with a plea to imagine
"very particular" bosses, would be a sign of psychopathological obsession in the real
7world. Further, it creates an internal inconsistency with assumption 4, above: If there
are at least three secretaries applying for the job, then assumption 4 requires that the
second- and third-best secretaries be of different, determinable rank (i.e., not be
equivalent) while assumption 6 ultimately defines their values as equivalent. Further,
even the most particular boss who considers his decision an abject failure ifhe does not
select the best secretary will still derive differential utility from the services of different
secretaries (once he gets through fuming). This assumption is dropped for my studies.
However, I will explore individual differences in how important it is to deciders to get the
"maximally" best option.
This sort of problem has attracted a notable amount of research from quantitative
psychologists, ranging from theoretical proofs of when it is "optimal to stop" (e.g.,
Edwards, 1965; Mehle & Gettys, 1979; see Ferguson, 1989 for a review), to computer
simulations designed to "experimentally" explore the efficacy of different decision
stopping rules in different implementations of the problem (e.g., Seale & Rapoport, 1997;
2000). Empirical research on human decision-making (rather than research using
mathematical models ofdecision-making) in optimal stopping problems has a history in
the cognitive psychology literature prior to around 1981. Shaklee (1958) suggested that
researchers should study what leads people to "cease observation and act," coining the
term "optional stopping" as it applies to any planned action.
Various researchers of the secretary problem have already relaxed various
assumptions of the secretary to various uses. For example, Rapoport and Tversky (1970)
provided complete distributional information to subjects and assumed that the subjects
8would understand and use it, but they did not test or whether or how this information
was used. Seale and Rapoport (1997; 2000) systematically tested each assumption in turn
against a number of decision rules, but did not use human decision-makers. Other
researchers used very similar paradigms to examine how long it takes participants to
correctly guess some quality of a sequence of numbers (e.g., the slope or the frequency of
some response; Corbin, Olson, & Abbondanza, 1975; Edwards, 1965; Fried & Peterson,
1969; Howell, 1966; Rapoport & Tversky, 1966, 1970), largely to discover stopping rules
in certain contexts. It is striking, however, that few ofthese researchers studied choice
contexts in which participants actually got the choice they made (something that would,
of course, be quite impractical in the secretary problem). These researchers also did not
have participants make decisions based on the distributions they viewed. Instead, they
had participants make direct judgments about the distributions themselves (such as which
deck of cards has which distribution; Fried & Peterson, 1969).
Two papers did at least examine human decision-making processes in which
participants were rewarded for optimal choosing, however: Rapoport and Tversky (1970)
gave participants a very straightforward optimal stopping problem: pay to see the next
card, or decide to "stop." When the decision-makers stopped, they were paid a sum
determined by the cards they had seen so far. However, Rapoport and Tversky's question
of interest in this study was whether participants' choices were close to a previously
derived optimal model of stopping, rather than addressing the question of how the choice
is made (Howell's 1966 investigation was similar).
9Corbin and her colleagues (1975) noted this lack of investigation into how
participants utilized information about viewed options in order to infer qualities of future
options, and attempted to examine " ...the processes by which subjects make their
selections," (p. 209), and did so by having participants draw cards from a deck and to
stop when they believed that they had drawn the maximal card in the entire deck.
Corbin's analysis, like mine, examines whether the values of the first few cards drawn
(i.e., the distribution of prior options) determines whether participants believe that a
chosen card is maximal for the deck. Corbin and colleagues, however, used decks with
only five cards in them, and examined only two factors in determining whether the
second or third card was chosen, making their conclusions very narrow. First, they
examined whether the second card is chosen when the first card is lower (it is,
sometimes), and whether this likelihood changed if the first card is far lower or slightly
lower (bigger jumps increase choice likelihood). Second, they examined whether the
third card is more likely to be chosen ifthe second card is far below the first card (an
"initial decrease") or mildly higher than the first card (the initial decrease did increase
choice likelihood).
The following studies will suggest that observed stopping choices are part of a
much broader effect: Decision-makers are learning the distribution of options, and that
these qualities can be represented in broader terms than describing the jump in value from
the first option to the second option and to the third. For example, in the two-card case
that Corbin and colleagues (1975) studied, they simultaneously manipulated the mean
and variance of the training set; in the three-card case, they also manipulated the skew
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and slope. In my study I will examine effects ofmean, variance, and slope explicitly,
treating them as qualities of the underlying distribution ofoptions rather than qualities of
the set of options under consideration. Corbin and colleagues also failed to take into
account any training effects across decks: Each participant evaluated 120 decks, but
though the "history" of cards viewed was their primary topic of interest, they did not
examine "history" beyond the current deck. Corbin and colleagues also rewarded
participants only for choosing the optimal choice (secretary problem assumption #6,
above). There has also been no research to date on how individual differences affect
delay length (these previous studies were conducted during the heyday of behaviorism),
nor has there been research exploring the processes by which delay is engendered.
I will extend these studies by going in a more applied direction: The current
studies will model when people choose to stop in problems such as this, rather than trying
to determine a single optimal stopping point. They also seek to evaluate whether people
gather distributional information at all, and if so, whether people then make use of this
information to improve their choices. The goal of the present studies is less oriented
towards mathematically determining how to find the best secretary, so much as whether
people faced with situations such as the secretary problem are able to choose a good
secretary (objectively dermed via quality metrics, but also in terms of the decider's
subjective perceptions and revealed preferences). In essence, I hope to use the secretary
problem paradigm in order to understand how real people make decisions-and how
good those decisions are-in real-world analogs of the secretary problem.
11
Procrastination
Learning the distribution ofoptions, ofcourse, does not come for free. In most
real-world decisions, one must view a set of real options (without choosing any) in order
to have seen enough options to have a reasonable idea of what counts as a "good" option.
This necessary evaluation period constitutes a delay in decision-making-if one does not
choose the first option, one has delayed choice, and if one chooses the first option
offered, no distribution learning has taken place. As such, the delay of choice is
effectively a delay of action. There is an extensive literature on delaying actions more
broadly: the study of procrastination. However, while definitions of procrastination vary
across researchers (Steel's extensive review and meta-analysis spends half a page and
cites 17 references in the interest of defining it; Steel, 2007), procrastination in its essence
is negatively valenced: It involves putting off something that one intends to do and could
do now, without "good reason" to delay or even with an expectation to be harmed by the
delay. In this paper, I will use the word "delay" in a neutral manner, unless otherwise
noted, in order to distinguish it from more negatively valenced "procrastination." I will
argue that delay may be useful in many cases, and that there is much to study in the realm
of delayed decisions beyond that which is called "procrastination."
Procrastination's negative reputation, however, is not unmerited. Prior work
shows that individual differences in procrastination do exist, and that those who
passively ignoring scheduled tasks (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Tice & Baumeister,
1997). People procrastinate on everyday activities because they predict that the activities
12
will be unpleasant, because they view the tasks as impositions or unfair demands, or
because they fear they will not complete the task adequately (Effert & Ferrari, 1989).
Procrastination in school contexts has been shown to lead to poorer grades on work for
which people chose to procrastinate, as well as greater stress and worse health (ostensibly
due to the stress; Tice & Baumeister, 1997). Procrastinators are poorer at self-regulation,
and the extra "free time" they gain from not doing tasks when they should be optimally
done does not protect them from lowered overall satisfaction with life (Milgram, Sroloff,
& Rosenbaum, 1988).
In their defense, procrastinators also feel less stress while their tasks are put off
than those who do not procrastinate, leading in some contexts to an experience of less
stress overall (Tice & Baumeister, 1997). Procrastinators also are not easily classified as
simply "haphazard actors," and do indeed behave in a manner that indicates careful or
systematic thought, often caring about completing their task and working towards the
task (albeit at an insufficient rate; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000). Some researchers have
found a striking absence of negative personality correlates of procrastination (e.g., they
are not more neurotic overall; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000).
While the above research has defined "procrastinators" as those who self-report
procrastinating, other research has identified behavioral measures that distinguish
between procrastinators and non-procrastinators. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) show
that in fact most people do indeed procrastinate (to their detriment) to some degree,
indicating that procrastination is a problem for many or even most individuals (and that
the median split methodology of self-reported procrastinators used by Steel, Ferrari, and
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colleagues may lump many people who procrastinate into the "non-procrastinator"
category; Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Harriott & Ferrari, 1996; Steel, Brothen, & Wambach,
2001). However, Ariely and Wertenbroch also suggest that people show adaptive
resistance to procrastination. For example, when not provided a deadline for a school
project, many people created their own (earlier) deadlines in an effort to not miss a
deadline that actually matters, and these individuals fare better than those who do not
create their own deadlines (though not as well as individuals whose deadlines were
externally imposed).
Whereas Steel and colleagues (2001) suggest that the lack of correlation with
personality variables may be due to the difference between self-report and behavioral
scales (the "procrastinator" label may threaten one's self-concept), another explanation is
that procrastination itself may in some cases be justifiable-or even admirable. For
example, if further reflection leads one to realize a flaw in one's plans, procrastination
may avert crisis. Indeed, in the case of delaying decisions, the parallel holds-if one puts
off making a choice and then better options become available, decision makers would
likely consider themselves wise for waiting, even ifthey didn't know that the better
option would appear. Similarly, the research literature on procrastination has not (to my
knowledge) experimentally manipulated participants into situations where delay may
provide a benefit other then the oft-maligned benefit of not having to think about an
undesirable action.
Some evidence for positive effects of delaying action in general (rather than
decisions specifically) does exist. Recent research on "unconscious information
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processing," in this context, suggests that those who delay (either actions or decisions)
may in fact be better prepared to act when the time comes (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2010).
Tice and Baumeister (1997) find that procrastinators experience less stress while
procrastinating although they experience much more stress when deadlines come due
(leading even to illness when many deadlines come due at once, e.g., during "finals
week" for a college student sample). Vohs, Baumeister and their colleagues have long
argued that any self-control task (such as completing an assigned task, doing effortful
work, or even simply making a decision) depletes one's ability to for self-control on
subsequent (irrelevant) tasks (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven
& Baumeister, 2000; Vohs et aI., 2008). This suggests that procrastinators may be
conserving personal resources by waiting until the last minute or putting off action. In
other words, the utility of procrastination (and, I will later argue, the delay of decisions)
may depend on the activity (or decision) being procrastinated. When all deadlines come
due at once (as in the case of "finals week" for oft-studied student samples),
procrastinators may suffer quite negative effects (Tice & Baumeister, 1997), though the
reduced overall stress that Tice and Baumeister show may in fact lead to better outcomes
overall when deadlines are more spread out (Tykocinski & Ruffle, 2003).
This also brings into question another item sometimes noted in definitions of
procrastination: Whereas Steel (2007) argues that in order for a delay to be considered
"procrastination." individuals must exvec{ to be worse off for delavim!. a conservation of
.... ~ .... .,; '-'/
energy model may suggest that people often either expect things to go fine (or at least
have no expectation of things going awry). Furthermore, research on the "Planning
15
Fallacy" shows that people frequently delay action until the last minute because
waiting until the last minute is fine so long as nothing goes wrong (see Buehler, Griffin,
& Ross, 1994 for a review ofthe planning fallacy). Whether or not this sort of delay
should be called "procrastination" is not widely agreed-upon. This suggests that there
may be two basic processes underlying an instance of procrastination: a tendency to
avoid acting, and a (separate, but perhaps correlated) misregulation in estimating required
effort and time to task completion. In other words, it is possible that people can delay
without expecting the delay to hurt (even though on average it does, and they should
arguably eventually know better). A two-process theory of procrastination indeed
suggests that there would be situations, such as the delay of decisions in order to gain
knowledge of the option space, in which delay is non-harmful or even helpful.
Decisional Delay: Qualities of the Decision
Decisional delay differs from procrastination in a few important respects. First
and most obviously, decisional delay is the delay of decisions and not actions in general,
making it a more specific construct. This suggests both that lessons learned of
procrastination can likely be applied to decisional delay, but also that there may be more
to learn about the delay of decisions specifically. Second, decisions do not always require
any actual activity-we frequently act immediately upon deciding, leading these to be
conflated, but the action is not the decision: As Yates and colleagues (2003) put it,
making a decision is making a " ... commitment to a course of action... " (p. 15). This
draws another distinction between decision delay and procrastination, as procrastination
is usually defined as putting otT an action (Steel, 2007). This is an important distinction,
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as procrastination has usually been studied in contexts where there is a non-negligible
amount of work necessary to complete a task: Writing even a lousy paper takes some
amount of time, while committing to a lousy course of action can be trivial.
Procrastination of acting and of deciding are related, of course: One can commit to a
course of action and then put off the action indefinitely, and the term "action" is
sufficiently broad as to include many trivial acts. One process that sits in the middle is the
Planning Fallacy, in which those who have decided upon an action misestimate how long
it will take to complete it (Buehler et aI., 1994).
Decision delay also differs from procrastination in that it is hard to argue that
"procrastination" is good, while delaying choice may well be. When deciding, further
deliberation (either conscious or unconscious) prior to committing to a course of action
may lead to a more reasonable choice, or at least to gaining additional information
(Bastardi & Shafir, 1998; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). This in tum
may lead to better outcomes in some contexts, while procrastination (by definition) is
consistently negatively valenced.
Similarly, there is some evidence that people simply enjoy waiting to make
certain decisions, ostensibly to allow for time to reflect or deliberate on the information at
hand or to allow new information to come to light. Tykocinski and Ruffle (2003) make
this argument well, in their response to Bastardi and Shafir (1998): They show that even
when decision-makers are given all the infonnation potentially provided to them, they
will still delay if not forced to choose immediately. They do this over several studies by
setting up three basic conditions in which participants must choose to enroll in an
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interesting elective class, or to not enroll: 1) They learn that the good professor is on
vacation; 2) They learn that the good professor might be on vacation (and are given the
option of waiting to find out; conditions 1 and 2 were both in Bastardi and Shafir's
paper), and 3) They learn that the good professor is on vacation (but are given the option
to wait until tomorrow for no reason). As many students opted to "wait for no reason" as
opted to "wait to learn about the good professor's vacation," indicating a preference for
waiting in general.
Beyond whether people wish to delay choice or not, I also separate qualities of the
decision that engender delay into two broad categories: qualities of the decision context,
and qualities of the options available. If a decision is a "commitment to a course of action
that is intended to produce a satisfying state of affairs" (Yates et aI., 2003, p. 15), then
many decision-making researchers have argued (at least implicitly) that when the same
courses of action are available (the choice set is the same) and the same states of affairs
are expected from those courses of action (the outcomes are the same), then choosing a
particular course of action more than once constitutes making the same decision.
However, research has shown that the "same" decisions may be decided upon differently
due to qualities of the decision-making context. Such context effects in decision-making
are argued to indicate some amount of irrational (or at least haphazard) choosing
behavior on the part of the decision-maker, as changing one's mind for reasons unrelated
to the options or their expected outcomes is hard to defend.
Context effects broadly relate to the delaying of decisions because any delay in
choosing may bring about a change in context. For example, putting off making a
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decision because one is in a bad mood may be "wise," as affect and emotions are
known to alter the perception of courses of action or expected states of affairs (indicating
that the decisions made under the influence of some emotions are not made via the same
processes as those made under other affective states; c.f. Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001;
Finucane, Peters, & Slovic, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Affective states also "carry
over" into the decisions for which the affect is irrelevant, altering the choices people
make (c.f. Forgas & Bower, 1987; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004; Loewenstein &
Lerner, 2003; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Many qualities of a decision-making context, defined colloquially, may be
relevant to the decision at hand. For example, in a poker game where the cards in front of
one define the decision-making context, the context is certainly related to the courses of
action and expected outcomes. The case in which context effects are unrelated to the
components of the decision, however, are more interesting for the purpose of this paper-
specifically when delaying a choice induces a change in context (gaining a better
knowledge of what future options might be), or when a certain context leads a decision to
be delayed.
Some researchers, notably Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007), have created
experimental contexts in which delaying decisions may have positive or negative
consequences. They use a methodology of simulating a course selection process in which
students choose a course to take in the following academic teml, over several simulated
days, including a "risk" condition in which new courses may be offered and currently
available courses may fill up. Categorizing people into "decisive" and "indecisive"
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groups using a median split on the Frost and Shows (1993) scale, Patalano and
Wengrovitz showed that the most "indecisive" (i.e., obsessive or choice-averse) half of
individuals waited longer and viewed more options than the less indecisive half,
regardless of whether the courses in question had a high chance of filling up. When the
course had no chance of filling up, the best (normative) strategy for deciding would be to
wait until all courses are available and then choose the best; when the courses were more
likely to fill, waiting is no longer normative. Patalano and Wengrovitz also showed that
the less decision-averse individuals were indeed more sensitive to risk (i.e., when in the
risk condition, they chose faster), while the more decision-averse individuals took the
same amount of time in both conditions. However, indecisive individuals waited longer
overall-in other words, even when there was little risk for waiting, more decisive
individuals appeared to ascribe a cost to waiting, leading them to choose faster and obtain
less optimal outcomes (defined nomothetically, without reference to the participants'
stated preferences about what they look for in a course) when the better choices appeared
later in the choice set.
This constitutes evidence that delay can lead to better outcomes so long as the
delay is for "good reason." Whether the more decision-averse individuals were basing
their choices of whether to delay on information they were shown or not was not
addressed by Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007); I also note that their two measures of
decision aversion (Frost & Shows' 1993 Indecisiveness Scale and the Melbourne
Decision Making Questionnaire's decision procrastination scale by Mann, Burnett,
Radford, & Ford, 1997, discussed at greater length in Individual differences: Decisional
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delay, below), which were reasonably correlated, do not produce consistently similar
results when used interchangeably in Patalano and Wengrovitz's studies.
Beyond decision context, the options that are available to decision-makers appear
to influence the relative valuation of other options in the choice set. When delay is an
available option, the choice of whether to delay should similarly be affected by the other
options available. A better understanding of the distribution of options available may lead
decision-makers to delay when they expect better options to appear. For example, if one
has never booked a flight to San Francisco, a $200 ticket might seem reasonable (or not),
but many people (anecdotally) report waiting to "see what the prices do"---even if they
might go up, or if paying $200 would not be a burden. Indeed, research on the relevance
of irrelevant alternatives suggests that in many cases, irrelevant or wholly dominated
options can lead decision-makers to avoid a choice, seek other options, or reverse their
preferences (Dhar, 1997; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Tversky & Shafir, 1992).
This is not necessarily a pure "context effect," however: From a statistical standpoint, the
presence of additional options communicates to decision-makers information about the
distribution of the whole option set (including options that are unavailable, and thus
options that might become available if the decision were delayed). Thus, seemingly
"irrelevant" data points may actually be relevant: Delay is sought for the express purpose
of "gaining information," even ifrelying upon that information may not be wise (c.f.
Bastardi & Shafir, 1998). Though Bastardi and Shafir argue that this process
(specifically, the use of irrelevant information) is irrational, this work does show that
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"gaining information" is one reason people delay, a tactic that may prove wise in other
contexts.
Tversky (1972) also discusses the theoretical problem of "independence of
irrelevant alternatives" in his elimination by aspects model. This model suggests that
difficult decisions may be made, in part, by rejecting options outright (i.e., in a non-
compensatory manner) if they have or lack some important "aspect:" If someone is
indifferent between a vacation in Europe or the Far East (probability of 0.5 of choosing
either), they should be indifferent between two similar trips to Europe and two similar
trips to the Far East (probability of 0.25 of choosing any). This leads to a conclusion that
such a decision-maker would also be indifferent among one trip to Europe and two trips
to the Far East (with a probability of 0.33 of choosing any of the three). Rather, we might
more intuitively expect something closer to a probability of 0.5 for the trip to Europe and
a probability of 0.25 for either trip to the Far East, effectively evaluating the "aspect" of
locale first and eliminating those options that do not pass muster for that aspect.
Conversely, if some triviality were provided (such as a free bottle of wine accompanying
only one of the trips to Europe), then the European trip that lacked the "wine" aspect
would serve to eliminate one European option (if Europe was chosen during the
evaluation ofthe "locale" aspect, earlier). This finding, and Tversky's elimination by
aspects model, also provide evidence for "choice set" effects, or that the overall choice
context is necessary to predict choice; knowing the qualities or desirabilities of the
options is not enough. Tversky's model suggests that in this case, an aspect of the choice
(such as the trip being to the "Far East" or "Europe") would be eliminated from
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consideration. My options-as-context model suggests another route to the same result:
The value of an option depends intrinsically on the other options available to the
decision-maker. Effectively, a trip to Europe without free wine means something
different when it is evaluated relative to a wineless trip to the Far East than when it is
evaluated relative to a similar trip to Europe with free wine. Additions to (or alteration of)
any option in a pre-existing choice set may lead a decision-maker to revalue the other
options-for example, the option of "waiting to choose"-as their knowledge about the
population of options has changed.
Studies of the so-called "disjunction effect" have also shown effects of shifting
option sets on decisional delay. For example, Bastardi and Shafir (1998; see also Tversky
& Shafir, 1992) show that participants offered the opportunity to choose whether or not
to take a vacation prefer to wait for contextual certainty (knowing whether or not they
passed a difficult exam), even though they would have chosen to go on vacation in either
case (participants who were asked to suppose that they passed or failed the exam before
choosing both chose to vacation). While this may be due to experimenter demand effects,
as the "wait" option was only offered in the "unknown outcome" condition may have
suggested to subjects that waiting was a wise option (Grice, 1975; but see also
Tykocinski & Ruffle, 2003, who suggest that people simply prefer to wait when
possible), it is reasonable to conclude from these studies that people prefer to wait 1) if
there is no cost to waiting, and 2) if they can identify information that they would gain by
waiting (Bastardi & Shafir, 1998; Duncan, Wengrovitz, Sedlovskaya, & Patalano, 2007;
Tykocinski & Ruffle, 2003). However, humans have difficulty taking the perspective of
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someone who has knowledge they don't or who does not have knowledge they do--
likely including themselves at a future time (see Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989;
Fischhoff, 1975; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 2003 for cognitive failures to take
perspective, and Ariely & Loewenstein, 2006; Loewenstein, 1996; Van Boven &
Loewenstein, 2003 for visceral and emotional failures to imagine one's own perspective
at a different time). Given this difficulty in imagining hypotheticals, it was arguably wise
for Bastardi and Shafir's decision-makers not to judge the information as "non-
instrumental" before they had the information available (especially as the experimental
paradigm called attention to this lack of information immediately before asking decision-
makers to choose).
Dhar (1997) also suggests that choice deferral, or preference for a "no choice" or
"seek more options" option, can result from changes in the option set-when a new
option is included in the option set, there may be a higher or lower chance that the
decision maker will choose deferral. Consider a choice with three options: A, B, and
delaying the decision. Dhar shows that people are more likely to defer when option B is
similar to A and less likely to defer when B is far inferior to A, compared to a two-option
choice (including only item A and delay). While these studies make an important point
about how adding or deleting options from a set can alter the relative desirability of those
options, the explanations previously provided still remain at the level of the options
themselves (in this case, interactions among the options such as "one is inferior to the
other"), but stop short of addressing a broader issue of the choice set composition or the
decision-maker's understanding of the population of options from which the proffered
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options are drawn. I suggest that the process at work in Dhar's studies is an effect
whereby decision-makers are seeing a more variable option set as deserving of more
consideration than a less-variable option set, and are thus delaying to gain more
knowledge of the distribution.
These studies together consistently suggest that individual options take on
different meaning depending on what the other available options are; that making
changes in the overall choice set may alter delays in choosing when delay is an option;
and that the qualities of the individual options apparent to participants at anyone point
may be insufficient to explain these delays. The explanations of extreme options, tradeoff
contrasts, and option conflict may be specific cases of a more general phenomenon of
understanding the distribution of options available to the decision maker, and determining
whether, given that decision maker's estimate of the distribution, she is likely to [md
options in the future that are superior to the ones currently available. For example,
consider a variance-based description ofDhar's (1997) study: Dhar shows that when
there is only one option in the option set (and thus no variance or information about the
distribution), deferral happens at a certain rate depending solely on the quality of the
option. When another option is added, deferral goes up when the variance is low (the
options are similar and thus it is hard to tell what counts as "good") and down when the
variance is high (one option is clearly superior). However, it is less clear whether this
pattern would continue with the addition of subsequent options: J predict that at some
point, adding enough similar options (i.e., choosing among a low variance set with
enough observations to determine the distribution, such as the vast array of nearly-
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equivalent jams on a supermarket shelf) is likely to lead subjects to feel confident
about making a choice and to not further waste their time by examining additional
options. In a high variance set, however, the next option viewed could be far superior to
prior options (or far worse), leading decision-makers to keep searching for longer, hoping
for a good, great, or fantastic option. For example, contrast wine-tasting tours taken to
find the "next great wine" with the process of buying an acceptable wine from the
supermarket, or scavenging tag sales for a "diamond in the rough" furnishing item rather
than going to Ikea for something that's "good enough."
Similarly, adding a third option to Dhar's study (defined above, in which B is
inferior to A) could generate a skewed choice set, with one option far above or below the
others. If decision-makers are expecting a certain distribution ofoption quality (in Dhar's
example, this would mean quality within product categories such as bookshelf speakers,
answering machines, or laptop computers), then the mismatch between the expected
distribution and the observed distribution should predict choice delay: Whatever options
are "missing" from the observed set of options are the ones most likely to appear in the
future, and so if these options are good, participants should delay.
This process is formalized in the literature on applying bounded-rational
satisficing procedures to everyday life (e.g., Dawes, 1979; Hastie & Dawes, 2001). The
rationale of "evaluate a subset of choices, then choose the best" is justified in this
literature via an argument that a swuple of a distribution represents the population
distribution, and thus gaining information about the options within the sample set is
useful. Some research, however, has suggested that there is such a thing as "too much
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choice" (Botti & Iyengar, 2004). This would, in tum, suggest that there is a limit to the
payoff from knowing more about the option space. In situations where many similar
choices are available (as in the cavalcade ofjams used in Botti and Iyengar's studies), the
information could be considered largely redundant-the distribution is learned quickly,
and nothing really stands out. As people are largely focused on the relative (rather than
absolute) value of options (c.f. Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, and their discussion of
"reference points"), a distribution-focused account ofBotti and Iyengar's result might be
that too much choice is not aversive, but that unnecessary or redundant evaluation is. In
terms of distribution learning, a great number of very similar options constitute a
distribution with low variability; I suggest that this may promote less evaluation and less
delay in choosing. As such, when yet more options (that scarcely differ) demand
evaluation, the overall choice process should be more aversive. In terms of the
distribution of quality, a "too much choice" study in which options are highly similar
essentially produces a histogram with one lone bar-any option will do, and no option is
great, potentially explaining the lack of interest in (and subsequent enjoyment of) the
purchased jam in their "too much choice" condition. Findings using this methodology-
in which items are close to indistinguishable-do not contradict the hypothesis that an
individual seeks to know (and perhaps benefits from knowing) the relative standing of his
or her options. Knowledge of the distribution of options is helpful, even if it means
knowing not to hold out or continue to evaluate options hoping for a "better" or "great"
option in a sample that shows little to no variance.
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Beyond the sort ofexperimentally controlled context found in the "too much
choice" studies, however, there are few studies that examine the relationship between the
context in which a decision is made and the extent to which the decision is delayed, or
which actually test whether participants are waiting to choose based on how well they
understand the set of (potential) options available to them. One reason for this is likely
the fact that varying experimental context often constitutes manipulating many variables
simultaneously, making it difficult to argue that the contextual variable of interest is the
one causing a noted difference.
For example, Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007) studied whether participants would
"put off' choosing which hypothetical course to take in a "course sign-up" paradigm.
They compared a "riskless" condition (courses were very unlikely to fill up) to a "risky"
condition (courses were nearly full), and allowed students to delay choice for several
"days" to see whether additional courses would come available; to make the point that
choice was risky, during the delay period, some courses would in fact "fill up." As the
same courses were used in both conditions, Patalano and Wengrovitz may be tempted to
argue that the "contextual variable" of "riskiness" is at work when choice delay behavior
is altered across conditions, when they have in fact manipulated more than just risk: For
each "day" that participants evaluated, the set of options available was different in the
"risky" choice condition, meaning that the relative (objective) values of each course had
changed. They are still comparing apples to apples, but how good "the best apple in the
bunch" is viewed as may depend on the quality of the rest of the apples as well.
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Individual Differences
There is likely more to delay than simply qualities of the situation and the action
involved. Qualities of the individual may determine or interact with these situational
effects to help predict delay of both action and decision-making.
Individual differences: Procrastination. The earlier discussion of
procrastination treats it both as an action and "procrastinators" as a class of individuals.
Supporting this distinction, many researchers have treated procrastination as an
individual difference (e.g. Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Harriott & Ferrari, 1996; Solomon &
Rothblum, 1984; Steel, 2007), referring to those higher in procrastination (those who
report procrastinating frequently) or "procrastinators." More recent meta-analytic work
has addressed questions about what sort of person a procrastinator is. Steel (2007)
discusses the trait-like status of procrastination: People tend to respond similarly over
time to procrastination scales. However, research and personal experience also tell us that
there is a task-based component: Certain activities, especially aversive ones, are more
likely to be delayed than others or avoided entirely (Milgram et aI., 1988; Solomon &
Rothblum, 1984; Steel et aI., 2001), whether the decisions are objectively aversive or just
aversive to the decision-maker. Steel's (2007) meta analysis also revealed that participant
impulsivity, irrational beliefs, lower self-esteem, lower self-efficacy, self-handicapping,
depression, boredom-proneness, lower conscientiousness, a larger intention-action gap,
and younger age also predict procrastination, \vhereas others have found evidence
suggesting that being a procrastinator might not be so bad: Ferrari and Dovidio (2000)
used these individual difference measures to show that those who are more prone to
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"procrastination" may be using the time gained by delaying action in an adaptive
manner, for example deliberating more or gaining more knowledge about the options at
hand. In some cases, this may lead to better outcomes in situations where there is
sufficient time to complete these evaluative tasks without risking outcome quality. Tice
and Baumeister (1994) show that those who delayed experienced less stress overall
(because they were entirely unconcerned with deadlines for the first while). However,
measurement of procrastination has been overly focused on the negative: One self report
scale for procrastination (the Procrastination Assessment Scale - Students; Solomon &
Rothblum, 1984) simply asks students how frequently they procrastinate, and validates
this scale against procrastinatory behaviors known to be negative and dangerous to the
student-namely, putting off class assignments.
In sum, the evidence for being a procrastinator is generally negative, but not
wholly so. It is important to remember, however, that these previous studies are all
approaching or measuring procrastination as an inherently negative trait: In the above-
mentioned meta-analysis, Steel (2007) notes in his work that, " ... the positive form of
procrastination.. .is secondary in usage. The focus of[Steel's] article is on the primary
negative form of procrastination" (p. 66). This is understandable, as the positive side of
procrastination is delaying an action for a good reason! Things done "for good reason"
are also less interesting to study from a psychological perspective, as most psychological
research seeks to identify the causes ofhehavior, and a "good reason" may be viewed as
a highly plausible cause, requiring little further investigation. Further, in the absence of a
reason to delay acting, it is hard to argue for delay: The further into the future we look,
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the less certain things become, and if a task must be accomplished and can be
accomplished now, acting now reduces uncertainty regarding our ability to complete the
task later or our inability to predict what might stand in our way (Buehler et aI., 1994).
Given this, "trait procrastinators," or those who procrastinate compulsively or avoid
acting if possible as a rule, are likely to suffer ill effects of this inaction. This does not
make a case against delay; rather, it makes a case against thoughtless or compulsive
delay.
Individual differences: Decisional delay. Much as the delay of decisions can be
distinguished from the delay of action in general, individual differences in propensity to
delay making decisions differ from individual differences propensity to procrastinate
overall. Research on "decisional procrastination" and individual-difference measures of
indecisiveness has indeed been conducted, though to date without addressing the
distinction between wise and foolish delay. First, there have been several measures used
to determine how indecisive or prone to procrastinating on decisions individuals are.
Among these, Frost and Shows (1993) developed an indecisiveness scale as a diagnostic
measure of obsessive-compulsive disorder. However, their scale used items that were
either negatively valenced (e.g., "I try to put off making decisions," "I do not get
assignments done on time because 1 cannot decide what to do first"), positively valenced
and reverse-coded (e.g., "I fmd it easy to make decisions"), or related to anxiety or
obsession rather than a propensity to delay (e.g., "I become anxious when making a
decision," "after 1 have chosen or decided something, 1 often believe I've made the wrong
choice or decision"), suggesting that the scale is unlikely to measure any variance in
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decision delay which would be considered adaptive or positive. Frost and Shows show
that their scale has consistent predictive validity for non-clinical levels of obsessive-
compulsive disorder, and also show that individuals higher on their scale are also higher
on general measures of (maladaptive, negatively valenced) procrastination (the
Procrastination Assessment Scale - Students; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984). However,
they operationalize "indecisiveness" as the amount of time subjects take to make an
immediate decision (e.g., they were shown two articles of clothing and asked verbally
which they would prefer without any chance to delay). While this appears to do a good
job of measuring sub-clinical decision obsession or choice aversion, these constructs are
decidedly different from decisional delay as I have described it. For this reason, the
results using this scale are more correctly described as results regarding choice-averse or
decision-obsessed individuals; I henceforth refer to the construct measured with this scale
as "decision aversion."
Mann and colleagues (1997) describe the Melbourne Decision Making
Questionnaire (MDMQ), a scale designed to measure patterns for coping with decisional
conflict (described in Janis & Mann, 1977). While this does not explicitly attempt to
measure decision delay (except insofar as we would expect decisions higher in conflict to
be more aversive, and thus counting as aversive tasks that are more likely to be delayed;
Anderson, 2003; Janis & Mann, 1977; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), the questionnaire
has four subscales that hint at parts of decisional delay: "buck-passing" (decision
avoidance) and "procrastination," both explicitly negatively valenced; "hypervigilance,"
referring to the same mixture of obsession and anxiety as Frost and Shows' (1993)
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indecisiveness scale; and a "vigilance" component, which measures positively
valenced items regarding care and deliberation in making decisions, but does not have
any explicit time component. For example, one "vigilance" item asks decision-makers
whether they take a lot of care or try to collect a lot of information, but does not address
whether or not doing so lengthens their decision-making process, while the
"procrastination" items ask about delay from an explicitly negative standpoint. Though
their factor analysis provides evidence that these four structures are independent, they
show rather strong between-subjects correlations (r's between .72 and .78 for the three
negatively valenced subscales, but much lower r's between -.17 and -.30 between the
vigilance subscale and the other three). Though this suggests that there may well be two
components of delaying choice, one positive and one negative, the literature on decisional
procrastination using these scales has used only the "procrastination" subscale (see
Harriott & Ferrari, 1996; Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000; Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2008), while
the "vigilance" subscale has remained basically untouched.
Finally, Kuhl's (1981) action vs. state orientation scale has also been used to
predict the delaying of decisions: Those who are oriented towards action are likely to do
things (such as make decisions), while those who are oriented towards the state ofthe
world as it is are more likely to work to (or prefer to) maintain the status quo
(Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000). The dichotomy drawn here is interesting, as
maintaining the status quo may occasionally require action (for example, politicians who
would seek to maintain the status quo often must argue and lobby vociferously), though
in most real-life contexts it does not. Manipulating individuals to be more action-oriented
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has been shown to reduce "inaction inertia" (Anderson, 2003), a tendency for people
not currently acting to avoid making decisions (van Putten, Zeelenberg, & van Dijk,
2009), though it has not been used in other decisional contexts.
Using the aforementioned scales, however, most researchers have studied what
they call "decisional procrastination," or maladaptive indecisiveness. Taking the
procrastination literature and applying it to a "maladaptive pattern of postponing a
decision" (p. 127), Ferrari and Dovidio (2000) showed that those who detrimentally put
off making decisions may not simply be disorganized or choice-fearing, but rather that
they may engage in longer, more specific information-seeking strategies, suggesting that
they may hold themselves to a higher standard of certainty (or be more uncertainty-
averse) than others. However, their discussion was speculative and they did not provide
any empirical evidence addressing the idea that decision delay may be non-negative or
potentially positive. Indeed, the literature still lacks a judgmentally positive (or even
neutral) approach to decision delay.
Other individual differences. Other scales pertaining to differences among
individuals may relate to propensity to delay choice, to good or bad effect. For example,
propensity to seek to achieve the best possible goal (to "maximize" outcomes) rather than
to accept a sufficient "good enough" goal (to "satisfice") has obtained a lot of attention
recently. Although it dates back to Simon (1955), Simon never discussed this tendency
as an "individual difference," or scale on which anybody may fall anywhere. Rather,
Simon conceptualized satisficing as a feature of human cognition, generating the study of
bounded rationality, referring to a decision strategy that mayor may not be used or not in
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a given situation and illustrating some theoretical situations in which satisficing would
be the only rational strategy. The newer literature conceptualizes maximizing/satisficing
as a bipolar scale representing a continuous trait characteristic, and suggests that
individual differences on this trait may affect life satisfaction and quality of decisions
(Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002). Schwartz and
colleagues developed this scale to measure the extent to which people maximize (as
opposed to satisfice), though there is also recent research suggesting that many of these
overarching effects may be overstated or artifactual due to flaws in the scale: Diab,
Gillespie, & Highhouse (2008) address these psychometric issues (including poor item
choice and unreliable alphas) cogently, and propose an alternative scale that more purely
measures the tendency to maximize.
The maximizing/satificing dimension (measured via whatever scale) is potentially
related to the incidence of delay in optimal stopping tasks: A tendency to seek the single
best option suggests that these individuals would be utilizing distributional information in
a different way, looking for an option above all other options rather than above some
distributionally defined cutoff In other words, maximizers! may delay much longer,
achieving minimal (but potentially reliable) gains relative to satisficers-but also
suggesting that the potentially extreme added effort may not be worth it. This is
addressed briefly by Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007), who used Schwartz and
! I frequently will refer to "maximizers" or "satisficers" throughout this paper for ease of
expression; in all such cases, I am referring to those who are higher or lower,
respectively, on a continuous maximizing-to-satisficing scale.
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colleagues' maximizing scale (Diab and colleagues' critique and scale was
unpublished as of that time), and suggest that decision-averse individuals are best
conceptualized as satisficers with a very high "satisfactory" cutoff, while maximizers are
more decisive, effectively determining that they have found the "best" option even when
many options remain unexamined, leading them to choose sooner and thus occasionally
end up with paradoxically worse outcomes than the satisficers. Patalano and Wengrovitz
did not, however, attempt to test this rather convoluted explanation empirically.
Finally, because the notion of distribution learning is inherently numerical (being
based on statistics and probability), there is reason to believe that those who are more
enamored of numbers may show faster learning and more nuanced use of the information
provided. Peters and colleagues' (2006) numeracy research suggests that some
individuals are not only better at mathematical tasks, but also take pleasure in the
processing and manipulation of numbers. In tasks which lack a clear "right answer" or
even a clear indication ofwhat makes a choice "good" (for example, multiattribute
decisions for which it is not clear how attributes should be weighted against each other;
c.f. Timmermans, 1993), the mathematical complexity of determining which options are
better than the others may lead more numerate individuals to make choices based on
more of the available options or to utilize more information in general when making
choices.
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Summary of Hypotheses and Prior Work
The question ofhow long people will delay decision-making in order to learn
about a distribution is hypothesized above to depend on how variable the options
available are. Support for this hypothesis is drawn from numerous studies (e.g., Botti &
Iyengar, 2004; Corbin et aI., 1975; Dhar, 1997; Patalano & Wengrovitz, 2007; Tversky &
Shafir, 1992) that show effects that could be explained as extrapolation from the
distribution of available or already-viewed options, to a population of potential options.
Other research on procrastination has lacked a judgmentally neutral approach to delaying
actions (and, by extension, decisions): I plan to extend this work by providing evidence
that delay of decisions is, in some cases, useful or adaptive. Individual difference
research into propensity to delay and decision-making style suggests that the tendency to
delay choice and the efficacy of doing so should vary across people.
Overview of Studies
The three studies described here take a similar format: Decision-makers
participate in an optimal stopping problem, and I examine how good their choices are,
how soon they make their choices, and how individual differences moderate these effects.
In Study 1, I ask participants to choose, in an optimal stopping context, the number of
minutes they will spend completing math problems (as opposed to having "free time"
online) during the second half of the study. I systematically vary the mean and variance
of the distribution of options in a 2x2 design: high versus low mean across the options of
how many minutes of free time participants will get, crossed with high versus low
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variance in minutes of free time. In addition, I collect subjective ratings from
participants about the quality of each option before the option is chosen or rejected.
Behavior is evaluated in terms of the quality of outcome achieved (both via ratings of the
option, but also using the objective number of minutes "received" to spend freely online),
how much choice was delayed (how many options were viewed), and sensitivity to the
distribution (the extent to which subjective ratings predict objective ratings and the slope
at which this sensitivity increases with more data), as well as individual difference
variables.
In Study 2, I replicate and extend Study 1 by varying the distribution itself
(presenting each subject with a particular random distribution rather than using one
distribution for all participants), examining four decisions per subject (asking each
subject to make a choice in each of the four mean and variance conditions, in order to
replicate Study 1's results within subjects), and adding a cost to delay: Participants are
either rewarded for choosing efficiently ($100 will be given to the single participant who
made the "best" choice, weighting time and quality equally) or punished for choosing
inefficiently (1 % of the stated free time was discounted for each option they choose to
view).
In Study 3, I utilize a more "real-world" vignette in order to extend these results
into a multi-attribute framework: I have participants consider a potential roommate, who
varies in terms of personability (how well they will get along with the potential
roommate) and financial stability (how easily the potential roommate can afford rent). I
examine sensitivity in this case by analyzing at the extent to which participants use the
two cues (personability and financial stability) and examine individual differences in
the extent to which participants use one or both cues.
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CHAPTER II
STUDYl
The purpose of the first study is to evaluate, as cleanly as possible, whether
participants are sensitive to qualities of the option set, whether they delay decision-
making to gain knowledge of these qualities, and whether sensitivity to these qualities
leads to better decision outcomes. For this reason, the study uses an easy-to-understand
unidimensional quality metric: in this case, time.
The basic design of this study is to have decision-makers complete an optimal
stopping problem in which they determine how much of the time spent participating in
the study will be spent having access to a computer and free time online, as opposed to
more structured, less enjoyable activities in the post-decision part of the study. Thus, in
the study, the "options" among which participants were asked to choose, were each a
number of minutes of free online time, with the knowledge that the remainder of their
time in the study would spent on the other activities, adding up to a total of 30 minutes.
Two variables were manipulated: The mean of the amount of free time across the options
(either a low or high number, corresponding to a mean of either 21 or 11 minutes of free
time across the options) and the variance of the amount of free time across the options
(also either low or high, corresponding to 2.65 or 10.59 squared minutes). The
distribution of options was a single random sequence of "study time" quantities, shown in
40
Figure 1; this set was drawn from a random-normal distribution and then shifted, in
order to guarantee that the relative worth of subsequent options was held constant. As
such, the shape ofFigure 1 is the same for all four conditions; conditions vary only in
terms of the scale and range of the y-axis.
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Figure 1. Graph of option quality as a function of order.
Hypotheses
In this study, I address two basic questions regarding the manipulated variables:
Do people delay decisions in order to learn what counts as a "good" choice, and does
delaying in this manner lead to better choices? I also address several hypotheses
regarding individual differences in decisional delay for these options. My hypotheses are
outlined below, and summarized at the end of this section.
Hypothesis 1: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Desirable
To test whether knowledge of the choice set is desirable, I predict that the quality
of an option (including "objective quality," or the amount of free time offered to
participants, as well as "subjective quality," measured as a Likert-scale rating of how
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"good" or "bad" participants believed the option to be) alone will be insufficient to
predict choice. In other words, the quality of the options should not fully mediate the
relationship between the number of options seen and the likelihood of choice: If
participants were uninterested in seeking distributional information, they should choose
based only on the quality ofoptions, and the raw number of options viewed would not be
significant once controlling for quality. If, on the other hand, number of options seen is a
significant predictor ofchoice even after quality metrics are included in the model,
participants are waiting for something other than simply the quality of the option. This
would support the hypothesis that people seek to learn about the options available to them
as part of the decision-making process. In sum, I predict that quality metrics will not fully
mediate the relationship between number of options seen and likelihood of choosing an
option.
Similarly, I predict that there will be no difference between the "high" and "low"
mean condition when predicting the amount of time participants spend deciding. In other
words, whether the average amount of free time is high or low should not affect how
many options are seen. This is a more direct test of the meditational hypothesis above: If
the quality of options is systematically varied while the relative quality of options is held
stable, a quality-driven decision process would predict quicker choice in the "high mean"
condition. If, on the other hand, choice is not based on raw quality (for example, ifit is
based on the quality of each option relative to the set of options available), then the two
mean conditions may not differ.
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I conversely predict that the variance manipulation will predict choice delay:
Participants in the high variance condition will take longer to choose than those in the
low variance condition, regardless of the mean quality. If people are sensitive to their
knowledge of the distribution of options and prefer to gain this information before
deciding, then a more variable set of options should lead participants to feel as if they did
not understand the distribution as well. Because the options shown in the two variance
conditions will have the same relative distribution (the same rank order of options as well
as the same standardized difference between options), a preference for viewing more
options in the high variance condition should indicate that peoples' desire to learn about
the distribution is based on a known truth of statistical inference: Inference (such as
inferring that the offered option is optimal) is less precise or trustworthy when there is
high variance. Thus, I predict that there will be no difference in length of delay between
the high and low mean conditions; however, there will be an effect of variance condition.
Finally, I predict that the number of options seen will interact with the quality
(both subjective and objective) of the option, such that seeing more options causes quality
to become a better predictor of an option being chosen. I predict this because, as
distributional knowledge is gained, participants should gain a better understanding of
what "option quality" really means-they will learn what counts as a "good" choice for
the set of options available to them. As they learn what counts as a good choice, the
quality of the options should become a stronger (i.e., more positive) predictor of choice.
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Hypothesis 2: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Useful
To test whether knowledge of the choice set is useful, I predict that the subjective
ratings decision-makers provide will, with the viewing of more options, become a more
accurate measure of the viewed options' objective qualities (number of minutes of free
time). In other words, I predict that as participants gain more knowledge of the choice set
(by simply viewing more options), their subjective ratings of option quality will show
increased correspondence to the options' objective quality. I also predict that the amount
of delay before choosing will show a "diminishing returns" relation with decision-quality
such that delay will predict higher quality at first, but as more and more options are
viewed, additional delay will not continue to lead to yet-better decisions being made. In
other words, I predict a positive linear effect of delay on the quality of the eventually
chosen option, but only in the context of a negative quadratic effect.
In addition, I predict that subjective ratings (the measure of how good options
"seem" to participants) will show a relationship to relative objective ratings, over and
above the effect of raw objective ratings. In other words, while I expect that subjective
ratings of options will be related to the objective values (equal to the number of minutes
of free time), I expect a further effect to be present when looking at relative objective
value, or how objectively good an option is relative to the other options seen so far. Such
an effect would reinforce the argument that distributional information is useful, showing
that, \vithin the context of l'lhat is Y1Oo..L110l'ln about a distribution, our affective responses to
options depend on their contextual meaning (is this "good" because it is better than most
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of the options seen?) over and above the absolute objective meaning (is this "good"
because 17 is a good number of minutes of free time?).
Hypothesis 3: Individuals Will Differ in How They Utilize Distributional
Information
To test individual differences in delay, I predict that those who are averse to
making decisions will be more "extreme" in their decision-delaying behavior (Le., will be
further from the mean). I will count how many options are viewed by each individual,
and then examine both the raw number (the total amount of delay) and the mean absolute
deviation (how far an individual's amount of delay is from the average amount of delay),
in order to simultaneously capture those who make their decisions hastily or perseverate
unnecessarily. I expect the decision-averse to be higher on the latter variable (absolute
extremity of delay), but nonsignificant on the former variable (raw quantity of delay).
This pattern of results would show that extremity of delay is the factor at work rather than
simply picking up on a higher or lower amount of delay.
I also predict that more vigilant decision makers will take longer to choose than
the less vigilant, but that this additional delay will not reach the point of diminishing
returns. Thus, there should be a positive relationship between vigilance and delay, a
positive relationship between vigilance and decision quality, and a positive interaction
between vigilance and delay in predicting quality, showing that more vigilant decision-
makers make better use of the information they gain. For "maximizers," however, I
predict the same positive relationship between maximizing and delay (and the
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corresponding positive relationship between maximizing and quality), but either no
interaction or a negative interaction between maximizing and delay in predicting quality,
showing that maximizing does not lead to better outcomes outside of the fact that
maximizers delay longer (or, if negative, that maximizing blunts the effects of delay on
decision quality).
To test differences in sensitivity to the distribution, I further predict that vigilance
and satisficing scores will positively predict correspondence to the true distribution-in
other words, subjective ratings of the quality of decisions will be a stronger predictor of
relative objective quality (defined above) for those who are higher on vigilance or
satisficing. I also predict that decision aversion will be a negative predictor of relative
objective quality (i.e., that those more averse to decision-making will show a weaker
relationship between objective and subjective quality). Finally, I predict that, overall,
people whose subjective ratings correspond more closely to the objective ratings (and
thus have a more accurate internalized representation ofthe objective distribution),
conceptualized as an individual difference, will choose better outcomes, both objectively
and subjectively.
Summary of Hypotheses
In sum, I hypothesize the following:
1. Gaining knowledge of the option set is desirable.
1a. Quality metrics will not fully mediate the relationship between number of
options seen and likelihood of choosing an option.
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Ib. Delay will not vary between the high and low mean conditions.
lc. Delay will be higher in the high-variance condition than in the low-variance
condition.
Id. Decision quality and number of options seen will interact positively to predict
how long choice is delayed: Option quality will become a better predictor of choice as
participants view more options.
2. Gaining knowledge of the option set is useful.
2a. Subjective and objective quality metrics will become more similar over time.
2b. Delay will lead to better choices, but this effect will taper off eventually.
2c. Subjective quality will be related to the relative objective value of proffered
options, over and above the extent to which ratings track the absolute objective values.
3. Individuals will differ in how the utilize distributional information.
3a. People who are averse to decisions will have more extreme delaying behavior
than those less averse to decisions.
3b. Vigilant decision-makers will delay longer than less vigilant decision-makers,
and delay will be a better predictor of outcome quality for those who are more vigilant.
3c. Maximizers will delay longer than satisficers, but delay will not result in
especially better decisions for maximizers than satisficers (and in fact, delay may be a
better predictor of outcome quality for satisficers).
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3d. Decision-makers who are more vigilant, less maximizing, and less decision-
averse will produce subjective ratings that are closer to the relative objective values of the
option at hand than the less vigilant, more maximizing, and more decision averse,
respectively.
3e. People whose subjective ratings more closely track the relative objective
values of the option at hand will obtain better outcomes.
Method
Participants
Participants were 138 college students emolled in a Psychology or Linguistics
class at the University of Oregon, who participated as part of their coursework.
Participants signed up for the study via an online study-management system that was
designed to reduce selection bias by keeping participants blind to the subject of study.
The Human Subjects pool is comprised of students participating for credit or extra credit
in psychology courses; most students in the pool are in an introductory course. The pool
is predominantly female (58-64% across the terms analyzed in these studies), white (77-
78% Caucasian), and college-aged (M=20.07 years old, sd=3.32).
Procedure
Participants were told that they would be participating in an experiment on
decision-making. The basic study layout was described to them as part of the consent
process. Participants were then told that they would decide how to spend the second 30-
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minute half of the study: They would see a series of options, presented on a computer
one at a time, indicating how many minutes of "free time" they would have to use the
computer for their own purposes (for example, checking Facebook, playing computer
games, or surfing the web), and were told that the other time (30 minutes, minus the
number ofminutes they chose) would be spent piloting math problems for a study that
might run in a later term (which was just a cover story). This decision process was an
optimal stopping task: Participants were told (truthfully) that at any point they could
select an option offered to them, or they could reject it and move on to the next option.
Participants were also told that they had up to 100 options to view, and that if they did
not choose one of the first 99, they would be assigned the 1DOth. When they chose an
option, the decision would be over, and they would later complete the decided-upon
amount of free time, followed by the remainder of the 30 minutes working on math
problems, and then they would be free to go. Participants were told that they would also
be required to provide a subjective rating of how good they thought the option they chose
was on a 7-point Likert scale with anchors labeled "very", "moderately", and "slightly"
good or bad (depending on which side of the scale they were on), and "neither good nor
bad" as the central option's anchor. This process was displayed graphically and rated on a
computer, as in the example shown in Figure 2.
When participants were shown the example page, the computer also assigned
them to one of the conditions (low/high mean, and low/high variance) in a quasi-random
manner designed to ensure balance (i.e., they were assigned randomly to a condition
selected from the set of conditions with the fewest participants thus far). Participants
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were not aware that they had been assigned to a condition, nor were they told at all that
the options they saw were generated in any specific way. The research assistant running
the survey was also blind to the participant's assigned condition.
Decision 15
You will spend X millUl~s with fr~~ time (Y minut~s ~ol11plctjng math probl~ms)
How good docs spcnding X minules in free timc (and Y minutes completing math problems) sound to you?
---------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2. Participants' view of the decision they were making in Studies 1 and 2.
Participants then began the decision-making task as described. After completing
the decision-making task, the computer told participants to alert the researcher. The
researcher then noted how much free time they had chosen (it was displayed on the
screen at this point), but told them that before it began, they would first complete a series
ofquestionnaires, also administered via computer. These questionnaires2 were:
1. Schwartz and colleagues' (2002) maximizing/satisficing scale, a 13-
question scale answered via 7-point Likert response items anchored at
"strongly disagree" and "strongly agree." Schwartz and colleagues
2 Alphas reported here are the ones reported in the previously published and cited papers;
alphas observed during my studies are reported in the Results sections, below.
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report a = .71 for this scale, though Diab and colleagues (2008)
report a = .68.
2. Diab and colleagues' (2008) maximizing/satisficing scale, a 9-item scale
using the same response format as Schwartz and colleagues (2002),
designed to more precisely measure maximizing/satisficing tendency.
As this scale and Schwartz and colleagues' scale use the same response
items and share some actual items, these scales were presented as one
scale to participants to save time and eliminate redundancy; a = .80.
3. Frost and Shows' (1993) decision aversion scale, a IS-item measure using
5-point Likert scales anchored at "strongly disagree" and "strongly
agree," designed to measure the extent to which people are "indecisive"
or choice-averse; a = .87.
4. Mann and colleagues' (1997) Melbourne Decision-Making Questionnaire,
a 22-item scale with four subscales that measure decision-making
styles: Vigilance (6 items, a = 0.80), Buck-Passing (6 items, a = .87),
Procrastination (5 items, a = .81), and Hypervigilance (6 items,
a = .74). The original scale was designed with three-option scores of
"true for me," "sometimes true," and "not true for me," though in the
current study, scores were computed as the sum of items that the
respondent checked as being "true for me."
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After completing these measures, participants then had their "free-time," which
was timed by a research assistant who then brought them to a separate webpage for the
"math section." The first page of the math section was in fact Lipkus, Samsa, and
Rimer's (2001) numeracy scale (a 10-item scale with both multiple-choice and free-
response sections designed to measure mathematical skill; a = .78; see also Peters et aI.,
2006), which made sense to include in the "math section" as the scale is mostly numerical
questions such as, "IfPerson A's risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and Person
B's risk is double that of A's, what is B's risk?" The scale was scored in terms of how
many responses were correct. This scale was kept separate from the other individual
difference measures described above, so that participants would not be confused or
believe that they had started the math portion of the study during the administration of the
other individual difference measures. They then completed a series ofmath problems
taken from online example SAT tests (which were not scored). Upon completing the full
30-minute free time and math section, participants were debriefed.
Results
The Ime4 package (Bates & Maechler, 2010) for the R package for statistical
computing (R Development Core Team, 2010) was used for hierarchical analyses. This
package allows analysis ofmixed effects models, fit to both linear (commonly called a
"hierarchical linear model" or HLM) and logistic distributions. The data produced in
Study 1 included several observations for each decision-maker. For example, each
decision-maker made a choice to choose or reject each option that he or she saw,
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constituting a within-subjects design with a varying number of observations per
subject. For this reason, participant's subject ID is treated as a random variable.
An unexpected effect was detected during exploratory data analysis: The
relationship between a participant's ratings of an option's relative objective value and its
relative subjective rating was in fact "X-shaped" (see Figure 3, a density-enhanced
scatterplot of each decision made, not accounting for dependencies within subjects),
indicating that for some participants the relationship between objective and subjective
value was negative and for others it was positive. This was due to an individual
difference in this relationship found across subjects: Among the correlations between
objective value and subjective rating for subjects, 33% of these correlations were in fact
negative, showing an effect indicating that about a third of the participants preferred
options involving more math rather than less; this behavior was confirmed by the
research assistants that who conducted the study, who noted that some people appeared to
have chosen very low quantities of free time. In a subsequent study with a similar design
(Study 2, described in the next chapter), participants were queried about this preference;
some participants mentioned wanting to "help out" presumably by completing more of
the pilot math problems. To account for this effect in further analyses, the objective
values for those participants who showed this negative correlation were reverse-scored by
reflecting the value around the mean for the given distribution (high vs. low mean).
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Figure 3. Illustration of the X-shape found between subjective and objective value.
Hypothesis 1: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Desirable
These hypotheses regard the extent to which holding and gaining knowledge of
the choice set is desirable, thus making the obtainment of this knowledge a reason for
delaying choice. Hypothesis la was that option quality alone would be insufficient to
predict choice. A model in which option quality alone is sufficient to predict choice
would be consistent with finding that the number ofoptions already seen (hereafter,
"delay") would not significantly predict whether or not an option is chosen in a model
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that already contained quality as a predictor. This hypothesis was tested using a model
that included both objective quality (number of minutes of free time provided) and
subjective quality (Likert-scale rating of the option). A hierarchical logistic model
predicted whether an option was chosen or not and included fixed effects for subjective
quality, objective quality, and the number of options already seen, with a random
intercept for each decision-maker.3 This model showed a significant effect for subjective
rating, B = 1.46, Z = 9.81, P < .001, as well as number of options already seen, B = 0.04,
Z = 5.16,p < .001, but no effect for the objective value of the option, B = -0.04,
Z = -0.72,p = .47. In this context, it appears that the worth of the objective value of the
object was (unsurprisingly) not predictive of choice once the subjective rating was
accounted for. However, the fact that delay was also predictive of choice (over and above
the effects of the option's subjective and objective quality) supports Hypothesis 1a.
Hypotheses 1b predicted that participants in the low (versus high) mean condition
would not differ in amount of delay, whereas Hypothesis 1c predicted that participants in
the low (versus high) variance condition would show less delay. To this end, I used the
same modeling strategy as above, but included a main effect for the "mean" condition
and a simple effect for the "variance" condition within both mean cells. The simple-
effects approach was taken rather than using a 2x2 interaction strategy because these
effects are not expected to interact in a synergistic fashion: If there is an effect of mean, it
3 Because there is only one option that is eventually chosen in these tasks, it is
inappropriate to estimate other random effects within subjects. In this case, estimation of
the intercept controls for how likely a given option was to be chosen, based on the
number of options that were eventually viewed.
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is of interest to examine the effect of variance separately. Objective and subjective
quality and the number of options seen were also included as controls. As predicted, high
versus low mean condition was not a significant predictor of choice, B = 0.40, z = 0.84,
p = .40. Variance, conversely, was a significant predictor of choice in the "low mean"
condition, B = 1.95, z = 2.72,p = .007, indicating that participants in the low variance
condition were about 14% more likely to choose. In the "high mean" condition, there was
no effect of variance (B = 0.08, z = O.l2,p = .90). When the nonsignificant effect of mean
was dropped from the model, variance remained a significant predictor overall, B = 1.00,
z = 2.02, P = .04. In sum, Hypotheses 1b and 1c were largely supported, showing that the
amount of time participants delayed choice was affected by the variance of the options
available to them, but not by the mean level of objective quality.
Hypothesis Id predicted that quality and delay would interact to predict whether
an option was chosen. Because I expected subjective and objective quality to be collinear,
I tested Hypothesis 1d in two separate models, one for subjective quality and one for
objective quality, each of which contained a random intercept for each participant. There
was no interaction between delay and objective quality in predicting choice, B = -0.001,
z = -1.16, p = .25, but there was a significant interaction between delay and subjective
quality in predicting choice, B = -0.01, z = -3.93, p < .001. However, contrary to
prediction, the interaction was negative, not positive. This indicates that as people learn
more about the option set, their subjective values become worse predictors of choice. In
other words, as decision-makers delay more, higher-valued options are less likely to be
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chosen, rather than more likely; conversely, this could indicate that earlier in the
decision-making process, higher-valued options are more likely to be chosen.
As an exploratory analysis, based on the theory underlying Hypothesis 2b
regarding how efficacy of delay is expected to "taper off' over time, I added a term for
the square of delay to the model, which as well as the interaction between quality and the
square of delay. The resulting model showed the hypothesized positive interaction
between delay and objective quality, B = 0.009, z = 2.43,p = .01, and a negative
interaction between the square of delay and objective quality, B = -0.0001, z = -2.82,
p = .005, indicating that the objective quality of an option becomes a stronger
determinant of choice as delay increases, but that this effect tapers off in the long run.
The same pattern of results was found when predicting subjective ratings, with a positive
interaction between the linear effect of delay and subjective quality, B = 0.05, z = 3.21,
P = .001, and a negative interaction between the quadratic effect of delay and subjective
quality, B = -0.0006, z = -3.99,p < .001. While this pattern of results was not explicitly
hypothesized, it does provide one explanation for not finding the initially predicted
relationship, and supports the conceptual (non-operational) hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Useful
The second broad hypothesis was that there is utility in gaining information about
the option set. The first hypothesis in this vein, 2a, sets the groundwork for this: As
people see more options, their subjective ratings of the options they see should become a
better predictor of the objective quality ofthe options. As such, I hypothesize a positive
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interaction between subjective quality and delay in predicting objective quality. This
was tested using an HLM predicting objective quality from fixed effects of subjective
quality, number of options seen, and the interaction between subjective quality and
number of options seen, with a random intercept for each subject as well as a random
slope for both subjective quality and delay. This interaction was significant, B = 0.003,
1= 2.17, x2(l) = 4.71,p = .03.4
Hypothesis 2b predicted not only that delaying would improve choices, but that
eventually this effect would taper off. Operationally, this hypothesis is that delay will
show a positive linear effect, predicting higher-quality choices, but a negative quadratic
effect, indicating diminishing returns. This hypothesis was tested in two separate
regression models, one predicting the chosen option's objective quality and one
predicting subjective quality. Because the high and low mean condition had different
expected values, this effect was modeled separately within the high and low mean
condition (i.e., as a simple effects analysis). For objective quality, the predicted effects
were present, with a marginal positive linear effect of delay in the "high mean" condition,
B = 1.32, 1(85) = 1.85, p = 0.07, a significant positive linear effect of delay in the "low
4 Because there is some debate on the accuracy of estimating degrees of freedom in
hierarchical models such as this (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), I report the I-value
and a p-value inequality such as p < .05, rather than a precise p-value. When the p-value
is close to .05,p is reported as marginal,p < .10. In some cases, when precise p-values
are necessary, I will report either the significance of the X log-likelihood ratio test of
whether the term in question significantly reduces the deviance when added to the model
or the bootstrapped highest posterior-density implied p-value using the languageR
package (Baayen, 2010; Baayen et al., 2008).
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mean" condition, B = 1.51, t(85) = 2.60,p = .01, a marginal negative quadratic effect
of delay in the "high mean" condition, B = -0.001, t(85) = -1.63, p = .10, and a
significant negative quadratic effect of delay in the "low mean" condition, B = -0.002,
t(85) = -2.79, p = .01. For subjective quality, the same basic structure replicated: For the
low mean condition there was a significant positive linear effect, B = 0.06, t(85) = 2.37,
p = 0.02, and a significant negative quadratic effect, B = 0.0008, t(85) = -3.13,p = .002.
For the high mean condition the linear effect was nonsignificant but positive, B = .05,
t(85) = 1.33,p = .19, and the quadratic effect was negative and marginally significant,
B =-.0005, t(85) = -1.67, p = .10.
Hypothesis 2c predicted that subjective quality of each option would be related to
the relative objective quality of an option over and above the objective quality of the
option. Objective quality in this analysis as in earlier analyses is the raw number of
minutes of free time the participant would experience. Relative objective quality,
however, requires a transformation of objective quality. This variable was computed as a
z-score representing the objective quality of each option shown to participants, scaled
relative only to options the participant had already seen. So, if mi is the mean of objective
quality for items seen, Si the standard deviation of quality for items seen, and x the
absolute objective quality of the ith option a participant sees, then x has relative objective
quality given as (x - mi)/si.
This hypothesis was tested using an HLM model predicting subjective quality
from relative objective quality and "absolute" objective quality (plus the mean and
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variance condition as covariates), allowing each person to have a random intercept
(their own average subjective quality, or scale effect) as well as a random slope for
relative and absolute objective quality (their own relationship between these variables
and their subjective rating). I only examined ratings for the third and subsequent options
seen by participants, as the first two options had the same absolute quality (meaning there
was zero variance for the first two options, so relative quality could not be computed).
This model produced a significant effect for both relative objective quality, B = 0.34,
t = 5.00,p < .001, and absolute objective quality, B = 0.19, t =7.59,p < .001, supporting
Hypothesis 2c.
Hypothesis 3: Individuals Will Differ in How They Utilize Distributional
Information
Tests of hypotheses of individual differences took one of three forms: predictions
of decision delay, predictions of decision quality, and predictions of distribution
sensitivity (defined as the correlation that each individual shows between subjective
quality and relative objective quality, transformed into a z-score using Fisher's method).
Initial analyses suggested that the scales were functioning as expected: Alphas for all
scales exceeded .60. Lower alphas were shown by the MDMQ scales (vigilance
alpha=0.69 and decisional procrastination alpha=0.75; these were implemented as
dichotomous checklist scales rather than the three-valued scales used by Mann and
colleagues, 1997, so lower alphas are to be expected in my study). The Schwartz and
colleagues (2002) maximizing scale also had a low alpha of .61, which is more consistent
with Diab and colleagues' (2008) report of the Schwartz scale than Schwartz and
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colleagues' report. Similarly, these scales correlated with each other in the expected
manner: The Diab and Schwartz scales, which both measure maximizing, correlated at
r = 0.53, p < .001. Diab and colleagues report a correlation of 0.48 between these scales;
this is not significantly different from observed correlation in Study 1, z = 0.59,p = .55.
The Frost and Shows (1993) indecisiveness questionnaire correlated with the MDMQ
decision procrastination scale at r = 0.58,p < .001. Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007)
reported r = .66 which does not differ from the current data, z = -0.83,p = .40.
However, these individual difference measures were almost wholly unrelated to
the behavioral measures collected in this study (amount of delay, subjective quality,
objective quality, and sensitivity to the distribution). While a few significant or marginal
results were found, these results became insignificant when accounting for family-wise
type-I error. Furthermore, when they were found, they were found in only one of two
measures of a construct (e.g., were significant for the Schwartz maximizing scale but not
the Diab scale); these results are thus not considered reliable and thus not reported.
Discussion
Study 1 provided broad support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, supporting
the idea that people delay choice in order to gain information about the distribution of
options (Hypothesis 1), and that doing so helps them achieve better outcomes
(Hypothesis 2). These findings were demonstrated in several ways: The objective quality
of a choice was insufficient to predict choice-those who had viewed more options were
also more likely to choose (Hypothesis 1a). This suggests that people are in fact "holding
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out" for more information or better options: It appears that as people gain knowledge
of what the option space is like, the quality (either objective or subjective) of the option
becomes more relevant (Hypothesis 1d). When option sets are more variable, people also
prefer to view more options before choosing (Hypothesis 1c). This result was significant
only in the "low-mean" condition, however, which is puzzling. This could have occurred
for several reasons: The first is that, for the high-mean condition, several of the options
were effectively "at ceiling": Because there were only 30 minutes of free time to be had,
options such as 28 and 29 might have been considered "ideal" in the high-mean
condition, rendering the variance ofthe option set much less relevant. People often took
longer to make a choice when they saw more variable options (Hypothesis 1c), even
when the means and relative differences among the objective values of the options
remained the same, further suggesting that people "hold out" for more information when
they are more unsure about the range of options, again supporting the idea that people
seek information about distributions of options.
Hypothesis 2, that people are in fact learning the distribution better as they view
more options, also found broad support. For example, as people viewed more options,
their subjective ratings also grew closer to the objective value of the items they saw
(Hypothesis 2a): People aren't just "waiting around" to view more choices just because
people prefer to wait or enjoy procrastinating, as was suggested by Tykocinski and Ruffle
(2003) and Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). Instead, decision-makers' sublective ratings
- ' , ...-
were becoming more "attuned" to the distribution shown to them as they saw more
options (Hypothesis 2c), as evidenced by their subjective and objective ratings growing
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closer together as participants viewed more options, indicating that the objective values
were effectively being "internalized" into decision-makers' subjective ratings.
Gathering distribution information and becoming better-attuned to the distribution
that one has viewed also led people to make better choices: People who delayed longer
were shown to make better choices (Hypothesis 2b), both in terms of their subjective
ratings (people rated the option they chose higher) and the relative objective value of the
options they have seen (people chose options that provided relatively higher numbers of
minutes of free time). This is not a linear effect, however: Viewing more options
eventually shows an effect of diminishing returns, with increased viewing of options
leading to better choices at first, but tapering off as more and more options have been
seen. Of course, my ability to detect this point of diminishing returns is based on the fact
that some people reached this point: Why some people reach this point of diminishing
returns and still continue to view more options is a question for future research. One
possibility is that it is an artifact of the single distribution used for this study: The
distribution in question may have a "point of diminishing returns" that occurs prior to
when participants feel that they have gathered enough contextual information to make a
choice. Another possibility is that this is necessarily the case: In order to induce that the
distribution in question is normal, participants would need to see data consistent with a
normal distribution: most options being similar, with a few being much higher or lower
than the mean. To discover that a few options are higher or lower, of course, one must see
some "higher" options and not take them; when they come up again, they are unlikely to
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be very superior to those already seen, thus indicating that the point of diminishing
returns has been reached.
As predicted by Hypothesis 2c, peoples' subjective judgments ofwhether options
are good or bad depend on relative value metrics as well as absolute metrics: When
participants viewed many options, the relative value of those options (i.e., the
standardized value relative to the options seen) predicted subjective ratings over and
above the absolute or "raw" value of the options (that is, the number of minutes of free
time). This is consistent with a wide body ofliterature: For example, the classic
"anchoring and adjustment" effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, and many subsequent
papers) shows that when one number is provided to decision-makers (even a completely
irrelevant number), that number partially determines estimates ofquantities provided by
participants later. The results supporting Hypothesis 2c also support the literature
regarding how judgments of value and quality depend on a reference point (e.g., are
"relative;" Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
However, this behavior should not be considered an "error." It is entirely
appropriate, as each additional option provides new information about the relative worth
of all prior options (c.f. Dawes, 1990 for a similar argument regarding a different
judgment process). Given support for Hypothesis 2c, future research should be wary of
paradigms that show "preference shifts" when seemingly irrelevant options are added to
or removed from a choice set: If each option colors the worth of the others, it is not
appropriate to compare choice behavior across decision contexts wherein unrelated
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options vary as if some options are "the same," even if their objective values are
equivalent.
Surprisingly, there was essentially no support for the Hypothesis 3, the set of
predictions involving individual differences. Some of the sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis
3, regarding individual differences, had no past empirical support or extensive theoretical
basis beyond that which I covered in my Introduction, above (for example, those
regarding length of decision delay for those who prefer maximizing to satisficing).
However, the failure to find that more decision-averse people make decisions more
extreme on the delay attribute than those who are less averse to decision-making is
perplexing. There is, however, some previous support for this lack of results: Patalano
and Wengrovitz (2007) found only tenuous links between measures ofdecisional
procrastination and decisional delay. They found results using only one decision aversion
scale; not all of the metrics that could support their hypotheses did. Similarly, more
generally (and beyond the scope of this dissertation), psychologists have noted the
difficulty in predicting behavior from personality trait variables (starting with Walter
Mischel's 1968 book); this difficulty is increased when few behaviors or types of
behaviors are examined. As this study examined only one decision, my lack of results
may not be so surprising. To address this point, Study 2 examines more than one
decision. An in-depth discussion of the general lack of individual difference effects can
be found in the General Discussion.
One final point deserves additional discussion: The (unexpected) oddity that
several subjects appeared to be weighting options higher if they had less free time than
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more. A m~iority, as expected, did prefer free time to math problems, but some
participants preferred the opposite. There are several possible reasons for this, alluded to
above. One possible simple reason could be that these participants were confused about
the options they were choosing from and what a certain option meant. However, this
seems somewhat unlikely, as the graphical depiction of each option repeated both the
amount of free time and of time completing math problems (see Figure 2). A more likely
possibility is that participants had some intrinsic reason for actually preferring options
with more math problems to free time. Numerous possible intrinsic reasons could exist:
participants may have been eager to help pre-test math problems, disinterested in the
"free time" (perhaps due to mistrust of the privacy of the lab computer, the incongruity of
engaging in "fun" during an experiment, or perhaps having no specific desire to use the
computer at that time), or-as difficult as it may be to believe-simply enamored of
math. This latter possibility is unlikely, however, as an exploratory analysis controlling
for participants' numeracy scores did obviate this effect. In all of these cases, however,
their desire can be considered "real," and so recoding their objective value scores such
that more math (rather than free time) is considered "better" is appropriate.
In addition to the "math-loving" or helpful participants, Study 1 also has several
potential drawbacks. The first and perhaps most obvious issue is that all participants
effectively saw the same distribution of options-the results discovered here may be
artifactually related to the specific order seen in Figure 1. For example, the first few
options showed to participants trend vaguely downward, but then jump back up. Though
random numbers do not follow a pattern, people are very poor at identifying random
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sequences (Wagenaar, 1972; Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig, 2004; but see also
Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985 for a nice illustration), and may have believed that a
"downward trend" was present in the data, leading to hastier choice. Similar effects could
have occurred at any large or small drop due to participants interpreting the random
sequence as a pattern, or as showing a meaningful trend in one direction or the other.
There was also no clear reason to stop choosing at any point: As there was no penalty for
viewing many choices (besides the potential tedium of the choice process), these results
may not generalize well to many decisions people face in their everyday lives. These
concerns are addressed in Study 2.
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CHAPTER III
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to both replicate and extend the findings of Study 1.
Specifically, it sought to make the optimal stopping task "more real" by providing
participants with a motivation to choose sooner rather than later. Most optimal stopping
problems in the real world contain such a motivation, be it to shorten the decision
process, to lower the risk of a bad outcome, or simply to reduce uncertainty. Study 2
accomplishes this goal in two ways: First, one condition (the "cost" condition) added a
cost for delaying decisions: Participants were told (truthfully) that the amount of free
time they choose would be "discounted" or decreased by a percentage equal to the
number of options they had seen. Second, in the "reward" condition, quicker decisions
were motivated in a positive manner: Participants were told (also truthfully) that the
participant who chose the "best option," weighing time to make the decision and obtained
amount of free time on the computer equally, would receive a $100 reward. A third
condition, the "control" condition, was also included in which no motivation was
provided (thus replicating the methods used in Study 1).
An additional issue with the methodology in Study 1 was the fact that there was
no variation in terms of the distribution of options that participants viewed. In other
words, all participants saw the same sequence of options in the same order. While this
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allows stronger conclusions to be drawn regarding the different measured variables
(they were all equal in terms of the quality of each subsequent option), it reduces the
ability to generalize the results to more variable optimal stopping problems. To address
this, in Study 2, each participant's sequence was randomly generated by the computer,
using the same mean and variance as in Study 1. In addition, each decision-maker
participated in four optimal stopping problems-one for each of the low and high mean
and variance conditions, in random order. (In Study 1, this was a between-subjects
variable.)
Hypotheses
Study 2 was expected to replicate all effects detected in Study 1, including effects
which were discovered via exploratory analysis. Many of the hypotheses in Study 1,
however, failed to find support. In Study 2, these hypotheses are guardedly retained,
though replications of null results will receive special attention in the results and
discussion, below. Study 2 also introduces several additional predictions. First and most
broadly, the between-subjects effects shown in Study 1 are expected to replicate in Study
2 as within-subjects effects. In sum, the effects found in Study 1 will be present in Study
2 when they are measured within subjects rather than between subjects and also with a
separate random distribution for each subject, rather than a single random distribution for
all subjects.
The twu added efficiency manipulations (reward and cost) are predicted to
motivate faster decisions for those in the reward and cost conditions, as compared to
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those in the control condition. However, faster choices need not mean that decisions
will tum out worse. Instead, it could be that if there is motivation to choose quickly,
decision-making (and distribution learning, and distribution use) will all speed up in sync.
Thus, in Study 2, I predict that not only will subjective and objective quality metrics
become more similar over time (Hypothesis 2a), but they will also become similar more
quickly with motivation to choose quickly. In addition, delay will lead to better choices,
but this effect will taper off eventually (Hypothesis 2b), and it will taper offfaster with
motivation to choose quickly. Finally, relative objective quality of an option seen will
predict subjective quality, over and above the extent to which absolute objective values
predict subjective quality (Hypothesis 2c), and this effect will be stronger with
motivation to choose quickly.
My individual differences hypotheses for Study 2 parallel those stated in Study 1.
While few of these hypotheses were supported in Study 1, Study 2 provides a potential
for reprisal, with the potential that individual difference effects will be more apparent
when there is a motivation to choose quickly or when there is variance in the actual
distribution shown to participants. Thus, even ifmain effects are not found (as in Study
1), interactions with efficiency condition are still possible.
Study 2 also adds variation in the values of options shown to participants: In
Study 1, all participants saw the same values in the same order (e.g., the first option
offered was always the same after accounting for the mean and variance manipulations).
By generating random data, it is possible to test additional hypotheses that require the
value of an option to vary independently of that option's serial position in the list of
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options, as each participant experiences his or her own sequence of options. For
decision sets with a positive slope, I predict that choosing an option will be less likely,
while for decision sets with a negative slope, choosing an option will be more likely.
Summary of Hypotheses
Study 2 will test the following hypotheses, with new hypotheses added to those
from Study 1 in bold:
1. Gaining knowledge of the choice set is desirable.
1a. Quality metrics will not fully mediate the relationship between number of
options seen and likelihood of choosing an option.
1b. Delay will not vary between the high and low mean conditions.
Ie. Delay will be longer in the high-variance condition than in the low-variance
condition.
1d. Decision quality and number ofoptions seen will interact positively to predict
how long choice is delayed: There will be a positive linear interaction (between quality
and delay), and a negative quadratic interaction (between quality and the square of
delay), indicating that quality becomes a better predictor that an option will be chosen as
additional distributional information is gained.
Ie. People will choose faster when they are motivated to choose quickly.
2a. Subjective and objective quality metrics will become more similar over time
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2b. Delay will lead to better choices, but this effect will taper off eventually.
2c. Subjective quality will relate to the relative objective value ofproffered
options, over and above the extent to which ratings track the absolute objective values.
2d. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c will have greater support when people are
motivated to choose quickly.
2e. The observed slope of the quality of options will predict whether people
choose: Positive slopes will predict delayed choice, negative slopes will predict
quicker choice.
3. Individuals will differ in how they utilize distributional information.
3a. People who are more averse to decisions will have more extreme delaying
behavior than those less averse to decisions.
3b. Vigilant decision-makers will delay longer than less vigilant decision-makers,
and delay will be a better predictor of outcome quality for those who are more vigilant.
3c. Maximizers will delay longer than satisficers, but delay will not result in
especially good decisions for maximizers than satisficers (and in fact, delay may be a
better predictor of outcome quality for satisficers).
3d. Decision-makers who are more vigilant, less maximizing, and less decision
averse will produce subjective ratings that are closer to the relative objective values ofthe
option at hand than the less vigilant, more maximizing, and more decision averse,
respectively.
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3e. People whose subjective ratings more closely track the relative objective
values of the option at hand will obtain better outcomes.
3f. Hypotheses 3a through 3e will show greater support when efficient choice
is motivated than when efficiency is not motivated.
Method
Participants
Participants were 109 college students from the University of Oregon recruited in
the same manner (from the Human Subjects Pool, sharing the same demographic
qualities) as in Study 1.
Procedure
The study procedure was equivalent in almost all respects to the procedure from
Study 1, with a few exceptions. First, the description page explained that participants
would be completing the optimal stopping problem four times. Although participants
were not told this, the four problems corresponded to each of the between subjects
conditions in Study 1 (low versus high mean crossed with low versus high variance),
which were presented in a random order. Participants were told that for each of the four
problems, they would choose the number of minutes they wanted to spend in free time.
After doing this four times, the computer would randomly select one ofthe four times
they chose as the "actual" time they would spend in free time.
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Second, the "efficiency" manipulation was presented to subjects in the form of
the initial introduction screen they saw on a computer (this screen was, as in Study 1, also
read to participants and explained to them by the experimenter), in the "cost" condition,
participants were told:
... there is a cost to waiting! Specifically, there is a 1% penalty for each option
you reject. In other words, you will get 100% of the free time you choose if you
choose the first option, 99% of the free time you choose if you choose option 2,
etc. In other words, the faster you decide (assuming your choice is good), the
greater the amount of free time you will receive!
Participants in the "reward" condition were told:
... there will be a $100 prize awarded at the end of the term to whichever
participant makes the best decision in the shortest amount of time, weighting time
and quality equally. In other words, the faster you decide (assuming your choice
is good), the better your chances are ofwinning!
Emphases were present in the description read by participants. Participants in the
"control" condition were given the same instructions as in Study 1.
Finally, not all participants were given the individual difference measures after
completing their decisions: Nineteen participants instead completed these surveys in an
apparently unrelated study (a subject-pool-wide "General Survey," designed to collect
survey data such as this for many researchers) in order to test for whether the study
procedure biased responses on these tests. During the actual study, after participants had
made their decisions, participants were asked to provide electronic consent for these
earlier sur,'ey responses to be accessed. Participants \vere not told "\lhich Sur\lCy~
responses were accessed so as not to bias their further behavior.
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Results
The analytic strategy taken in Study 2 was basically the same as the strategy taken
in Study 1, though in Study 2, there were four decisions made per person. As such, the
random intercept estimated for each person is based on more information, but still
represents that person's overall likelihood of choosing across all four mean and variance
manipulations. As in Study 1, effects that can be measured within persons are treated in
all reported models as random effects estimated separately for each person and then
aggregated.
To account for the fact that some participants once again showed a negative
correlation between subjective and objective quality (indicating a preference for less
"free time"), the same strategy was used as in Study 1: For the four such participants in
the control condition (11% of the control condition), their effective value scores were
reflected around the mean for the distribution they were viewing. For the eight
participants in the "reward" condition (21 %), the same strategy was used. For the "cost"
condition, however, the cost was implemented by decreasing the amount of free time as
participants waited; for participants who preferred less free time, this fundamentally
changes the discount function. As such, the three participants in the cost condition (9%)
who showed a negative relationship were dropped from analyses that examined objective
value.
Finally, it should be noted that participants in the "cost" condition have two
"objective quality" measures-the discounted objective quality (i.e., the number of
minutes of free time they actually experienced), and the raw objective quality (the
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number of minutes of free time they were shown, pre-discount). Analyses were
conducted on both raw and discounted objective quality. When results for these two
values differ below, both effects are noted, but only discounted objective quality is
reported when the effects are of the same significance and in the same direction.
Hypothesis 1: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Desirable
These hypotheses regard the extent to which holding and gaining knowledge of
the choice set is desirable, thus making the obtainment of this knowledge a reason for
delaying choice. As in Study 1, support was found for Hypothesis 1a, showing that
number of options viewed is a significant predictor of choice beyond the objective and
subjective quality of the choice, B = .02, z = 6.l2,p < .001. Also as in Study 1, objective
quality was not a significant predictor, B = .005, z = 0.3l,p = .76, and subjective quality
was, B = 1.28, Z = 20.49,p < .001.
Hypotheses 1b and 1c predicted a significant effect of variance (higher variance
leading to more delay in choosing) and no significant effect of mean (low mean and high
mean should not predict faster or slower choice), respectively. Whereas in Study 1 found
an effect for variance and no effect of mean, Study 2 produced nearly the opposite
results: There was a significant effect of mean, such that being in the high mean
condition predicted a lower likelihood of choosing (and thus delayed choice), B = 1.04,
Z = 2.42, p = .02. As for the variance effect, there was a nonsignificant effect of variance
for participants in the high-mean condition (B = 0.22, Z = 0.46, p = .65), and only a
marginal effect of variance in the low mean condition using discounted objective value,
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B = 0.46, z = 1.77,p = .08. However, for analyses using "raw" objective value, the
effect of variance was significant in the low mean condition, B = 0.57, z = 2.19,p = .03.
This replicates the results of Study 1, which also showed no effect of variability in the
high-mean condition but an effect of variability in the low-mean condition. Together, this
provides support for the hypothesis that people take longer to decide when choice sets are
more variable (Hypothesis 1c).
Additional follow-up analyses were conducted, focusing only on those in the
control condition (to parallel Study 1) or only the first decision made (to control for any
effects of problem order). These analyses showed similar patterns to those described
above, with the people taking significantly longer to choose when presented with the high
mean distribution (B's > 1.04, z's > 2.40), people taking consistently more time to choose
when in the high variability condition and the low-mean condition in all analyses
(B's> 0.33, z's > 0.87), and people showing no effect of the variability condition when in
the high-mean condition (B's between 0.48 and -0.68, z's between 0.69, -1.69).
Hypothesis 1d predicted that quality would become a stronger (i.e., more useful,
or better attended-to) predictor of choice once people had gained distributional
information, operationalized as a positive interaction between quality (objective and
subjective) and the linear component of delay, and a negative interaction between quality
and the quadratic component of delay, when predicting whether a decision-maker chose a
given option. The predicted pattern of results was present in Study 2 for subjective
quality, which showed the expected positive linear interaction, B = .002, z = 3.13,
p = .002, and the negative quadratic interaction, B = -0.0003, z = -4.18,p < .001. The
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effects for objective quality found in Study I, however, did not replicate using
discounted objective quality in Study 2 (though the coefficients were in the predicted
direction, linear B = 0.25, quadratic B = -1.23, [zl's > 0.57). When using raw objective
quality, however, these effects were also present, in the correct direction, and marginally
significant, B = 0.0003, z = 1.7I,p = 0.09 for the linear effect, B = -0.00004, z = -1.67,
p = 0.09 for the quadratic effect.
Finally, Hypothesis Ie (which was new to Study 2) predicted that those in the
conditions that manipulated motivation to decide (via cost or reward) would choose more
quickly than those in the control condition. To test this, I examined whether the total
number of options viewed before choosing varied by condition, using hierarchical
Poisson regression. This model was hierarchical due to the fact that each participant made
four decisions, and Poisson regression was used as my the measure of delay was a
positively-skewed "count" variable (the count of the number of options viewed prior to
deciding; see Atkins & Gallup, 2007 for a discussion of Poisson regression). Condition
was dummy-coded to produce two predictors, which measured the difference between the
"cost" condition and the control, and the difference between the "reward" condition and
the control. These contrasts are used to test condition effects henceforth.
When controlling for objective and subjective quality of ratings (as a random
slope for each participant), this regression showed only a significant effect for the "cost"
('ont'lition 11. = -0 R, '7 = - ') hR n = 0 00'7 inr1i,,~t,no th~t th""", in th", ""d ""nr1,t,,,n
_'-' .........._............ "" .......,...., ...,._....".. ~.'-'_,j-/ 'lJ.'V'V'., .L.L ............._-'-.........O '-.L.a._" .L.L""oJ_ ............. .L__""oJ" _""......-.........L'-'.L.L
chose faster than those in the control condition. No effect was shown for the reward
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condition, possibly because the instructions for the reward condition told participants
to "weight time and choice quality equally," which may have increased the motivation to
choose a good option relative to the control condition (thus increasing choice time) while
simultaneously increasing the motivation to choose quickly.
Hypothesis 2: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Useful
My second broad hypothesis, as in Study 1, was that there is some utility in
gaining information about the option set. To replicate the results for Hypothesis 2a from
Study 1, as people see more options, their subjective ratings should more closely
resemble the objective quality metrics. In Study 2, this was tested in the same manner as
Study 1, and the results were similar: Subjective rating and amount of delay showed a
marginal positive interaction in predicting discounted objective quality, B = 0.002,
t = 1.86, i(1) = 3.43, p = 0.06; this effect attained significance for raw objective quality,
B = 0.464, t = 3.70,p < 0.05.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that the effect of delay on choice quality would be
positive but taper off. This was tested using a hierarchical linear model that estimated the
linear and quadratic components of delay as simple effects within levels of the "mean"
condition, but allowed these effects to vary randomly within participants as each person
made four decisions. A separate model was examined for objective versus subjective
quality, and each model controlled for the other quality metric. Whereas the results from
Study 1 were in the right direction but occasionally marginal, in Study 2 the predicted
effect was found for objective quality with all coefficients being significant: There was a
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positive linear effect in both the high mean condition, B = 0.10, t = 2.77, p < .05, and
the low mean condition, B = 0.09, t = 3.36, p < .05, and a negative quadratic effect of
delay in both the high mean condition, B = -0.001, t = -3.29,p < .05, and the low mean
condition, B = -0.001, t = -3.89,p < .05. In contrast, although the effects for subjective
quality were significant or marginally significant in Study 1, these effects were not in
Study 2.
Hypothesis 2c predicted that the relative objective value would be predictive of
subjective quality, over and above the effect of absolute objective value. To address this
in Study I, I computed a z-score for each objective value based on the values seen up to
that point. However, in Study 2, this value could be computed "relative" to all options
viewed within a particular decision ofthe four that each participant made, or relative to
all options already encountered across all decisions. To address this, analyses for
Hypothesis 2c were conducted twice: once with relative objective value scores being
computed relative to all options seen (including those from past decisions), and once with
these scores being computed relative to only those options seen for the given decision.
Both constructions of relative objective quality showed significant positive effects in
predicting subjective value, t's > 3.80,p's < .001, showing that the value of an option
relative to those seen contributes to the subjective judgment of that option over and above
the absolute value, replicating Study 1 in support ofHypothesis 2c.
Hypothesis 2d, new to Study 2, predicts that the predicted results for Hypotheses
2a, 2b, and 2c will be stronger when people are motivated to choose quickly. Though the
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results for Hypothesis 1e above showed that only those in the "cost" condition actually
chose more quickly than the control condition, both "cost" and "reward" conditions are
examined here. Study 2 showed marginal support for Hypothesis 2a, with decision-
makers' subjective quality ratings growing closer to the objective quality ratings over
time. To support Hypothesis 2d, this effect must be stronger in the "cost" and/or "reward"
conditions than in the "control" condition. Indeed, a two-way interaction was found
between condition (cost/reward/control) and delay in predicting the objective quality of
the option selected, indicating that subjects in the "cost" condition chose options with
significantly lower objective quality when they delayed choice longer, B = -0.14,
t = -6.23, p < .05. This may be due simply to the discounting procedure itself, however,
as discounted quality necessarily decreased with time in the "cost" condition; using raw
objective quality obviated this effect. No other 2-way interactions were found between
condition and subjective quality or delay in predicting objective quality ofthe option
chosen. The three-way interaction between motivation condition, amount of delay, and
subjective quality in terms of predicting objective quality of the option chosen, which
tests Hypothesis 2d, was significant for the "reward" condition relative to control,
B = 0.01, t = 5.22, p < .001, and significant but in the counter-hypothesized direction for
the "cost" condition relative to control, B = -0.03, t = -6.09, p < .001. Thus, being in the
cost condition, relative to control, led to a lower relationship between objective quality
and subjective quality over time when objective value was the "to-be-experienced" value
(the number of minutes they would actually attain, after discounting). Repeating these
analyses using the non-discounted values (i.e., "apparent" value; the number of minutes
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promised, pre-discount) produced the same positive interaction for the "reward"
condition, B = 0.01, t = 5.13, p < .05, though the significant counter-hypothesized
negative interaction for the "cost" condition did not replicate for raw objective quality.
As noted above, support for Hypothesis 2b was found in Study 2, in that the effect
of delay on (objective) choice quality was positive, but tapered off. If motivation to
choose enhances this effect, there should be a positive interaction between the "motivated
choice" contrasts and the linear effect ofdelay on choice quality (indicating that when
choice is motivated the linear effect is yet more positive), and/or a negative interaction
between the "motivated choice" contrasts and the quadratic effect of delay on choice
quality (indicating that when choice is motivated the quadratic effect is yet more
negative). However, neither of these effects were found: Only one interaction (out of
eight) between condition and amount of delay was significant, a positive quadratic
interaction with the "cost" condition, relative to control, for subjective quality, B = 0.001,
t = 2.01, p < .05.
The pattern of results representing Hypothesis 2c-that relative objective value
would be a significant predictor of subjective ratings, over and above the effect of
objective value-was also predicted to interact with motivation condition in Study 2. To
test whether this effect is enhanced when participants are motivated to choose quickly, I
examined the interaction between condition and relative objective quality; a positive
interaction would support this hypothesis. However, the enhancement effect was
significant for only one of 8 measures of relative objective quality: There was an effect
for raw (rather than discounted) objective quality, measured relative to the current
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decision (rather than relative to all decisions), for those in the "cost" condition relative
to control (rather than for "reward"), B = 0.21, t = 2.18, P < .05, indicating a very
inconsistent enhancement effect, if any.
Hypothesis 2e predicted that the slope of the options participants had seen so far
would predict delay: Positive slopes would predict further delay (in hopes that options
would continue to improve), whereas negative slopes would predict less delay (due to a
fear that options would get worse). This result could not be examined in Study 1, as
Study 1 gave every participant the same sequence of options; as such, there was no
variance in slope. To test this hypothesis, a variable was created that indicated the point-
slope of a series of options. In other words, much like the z-scores computed for analysis
of Hypothesis 2c, z-slopes were computed: I predicted the objective quality (corrected for
the cost condition, as discussed above) for each option from the index of that option,
using a linear model. A separate linear model was fit for every option viewed for every
participant, relative to all options viewed previously for that specific decision. The
standardized beta for the "option index" effect in this linear model was then taken as the
point-slope, or the slope that the decision-maker had experienced thus far when making
that specific decision. So, ifthe first three options were 15, 16, 18, and 17 respectively,
these values were predicted from the numbers 1,2,3, and 4 (corresponding to the first,
second, third, and fourth choice). This would yield a "point-slope" of 0.98 for the first
three options viewed, and a point-slope of 0.80 for the first four options. These point-
slope values were then used in a hierarchical logistic model as a predictor of whether the
decision-maker chose the given option. As was the case for analyzing objective quality,
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point-slopes were computed both based on raw objective quality and separately for
discounted objective quality.
The original model fit was a hierarchical logistic model, predicting whether an
option was chosen or not from the point slope, controlling for amount of delay and the
interaction between point-slope, delay, and objective quality (because the objective
quality of an option has more influence on slope for options viewed earlier than options
viewed later), as well as subjective quality. None of these models showed a significant
effect of point-slope.
Two exploratory analyses showed, however, that point slope does play an
important part in evaluating choices: Subjective quality was predicted by a two-way
interaction between point slope and objective quality. In this model, point-slope did not
predict subjective quality (as a main effect), but interacted with objective quality,
B = 0.03, t = 3.50,p < .05, indicating that more-positive slopes make yet-better options
seem (subjectively) even better (or that more-negative slopes make yet-worse options
seem subjectively even worse). A marginal positive three-way interaction was also found
when amount of delay was added to the model, B = 0.72, t = 1.85, X(l) = 3.44,p = .06,
indicating that this effect becomes stronger as more options are viewed. The same models
were not fit for objective quality, as objective quality scores were randomly generated
and thus predicting them is of vacuous interest.
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Hypothesis 3: Individuals Will Differ in How They Utilize Distributional
Information
Individual difference variables were collected in one of two ways: Some
participants (n = 19) completed their individual difference surveys as part of an unrelated
study, while the others (n = 90) completed their surveys as part of this study, after
making their decisions. These groups were compared using Welch's (-test to account for
the large difference in sample size. These groups differed significantly in terms of two
individual difference measures: Diab and colleagues' (2008) measure of maximizing
tendency, such that those who completed their surveys as part of the study reported
themselves as being higher on maximizing, (48.15) = -7.20,p < .001. This effect was
nonsignificnt for Schwartz and colleagues' (2002) maximizing scale. Those who
completed their surveys as part of the study also reported themselves as being lower in
decision aversion according to Frost and Shows' (1993) indecisiveness scale,
(52.05) = 4.33,p < .001, but not the MDMQ (1997) procrastination scale.
Hypotheses regarding individual differences in Study 1 were largely unsupported,
though in Study 2 these effects were given a second chance - both on their own, and in
interaction with whether choice was motivated. Specifically, it was predicted that the set
of Hypotheses 3 from Study 1 would show stronger effects in the efficient choice
conditions than in the control condition. The individual difference scales showed
generally the same reliabilities and correlation patterns as in Study 1. Once again, very
few significant results were observed, and those that did occur showed the same
inconsistent pattern: Significant but potentially spurious relationships observed in Study 1
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(i.e., those that were marginal or significant but then rendered insignificant when
correcting for family-wise type-I error) did not replicate, and new effects observed did
were not consistent (e.g., across scales that measure the same construct, such as
maximizing and decision aversion). In sum, the results for individual difference measures
are inconsistent within each of Study 1 and Study 2, as well as being inconsistent across
studies.
Discussion
Study 2 was a mixed bag in terms of replicating Study 1: Many of the patterns
replicated, but unfortunately this included the numerous null effects observed when
testing Hypothesis 3. In terms of replicating predicted results, across both studies,
participants preferred to wait for more information (Hypothesis la), especially when that
information appeared potentially useful: More variable option sets led to delayed choice
(at least when the mean level ofoption quality was below ceiling; Hypothesis 1c), and the
objective quality of options became a stronger predictor of an option being chosen as the
participants viewed more options (Hypothesis 1d), indicating that delaying choice led
participants to feel more comfortable basing their decisions on the apparent quality of the
available options (though this effect tapers off eventually). Delaying in order to gain
more information about the distribution was useful (in terms of achieving better
outcomes; Hypothesis 2a), though this effect tapers off (for objective and subjective
quality in Stlld)T 1, and for objective quality in this study; Hypothesis 2b). Additional
information was also useful in terms of gaining more knowledge of the distribution
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(Hypothesis 2c): People who viewed more options showed a closer correspondence
between subjective ratings and objective quality.
These replications are notable because Study 2 tested these hypotheses using
methods different from those in Study 1. First, the fact that each participant saw random
data across all four oftheir optimal stopping problems indicates that these effects are not
artifactually due to the single distribution used in Study 1. However, it appears several of
the effects found in Study 1 were potentially weakened in Study 2 by this methodological
change. For example, participants who saw more highly variable decision sets showed
much less of an increase in delay compared to participants from Study 1 (Hypothesis lc).
Study 2 also did not fix the potential "ceiling effect" problem noted in the discussion of
Study 1, above-because the numbers generated were actually random, it is possible that
some participants in the "high mean" condition may have seen ideal or near-ideal options,
for example "29 minutes of free time" when they knew the maximum to be 30. Similarly,
in Study 2, participants were in fact swayed by the overall mean amount of free time
offered-they chose faster when the mean was higher, whereas this was not the case in
Study 1. This finding in Study 2, however, does not contradict Hypothesis 1, which stated
that additional distribution information would be desirable. The fact that other factors
(such as the overall mean quality of options seen) may contribute to how many options
are viewed does not mean that people are not still interested in seeing more options when
the decision appears more variable, or that people are uninterested in learning about the
distribution overall.
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Another notable failure to replicate Study I' s results was for parts of
Hypothesis 2b. In Study I, delaying choices showed a positive (but tapering off) effect
for both objective and subjective quality (albeit occasionally marginal): Those who
delayed made better choices, but especially long delays had a negative influence on
choice quality. In Study 2, this effect was present for objective quality of the options, but
not subjective quality. While many have argued that objective quality is really the "gold
standard" of whether participants have made a "good decision," it is curious that the
decision-makers do not appear to experience this "better choice." One explanation for
this is taken from Hypothesis 2a: As time goes on, participants show a stronger
correspondence between subjective and objective quality, indicating that this
correspondence is weaker earlier in the decision task. It is possible that, by the time
participants have viewed enough options to feel comfortable choosing, the point of
diminishing returns has passed. This process would lead subjective quality to be less
related to delay earlier in the decision (when the linear effect is possible), making this
effect difficult to detect. Whether people learn fast enough to show such a subjective
effect is likely to depend on the actual distribution they are faced with. Thus, for
example, the use of random data in Study 2 may well have rendered these effects
undetectable, whereas they were detected in Study 1 (which used only one distribution).
Indeed, taking this into account, it is perhaps remarkable that the effect for objective
quality, some tests ofwhich were marginal in Study 1, replicated in Study 2.
Another methodological difference between Studies 1 and 2 was the introduction
of an "efficient choice" manipulation: Some participants were encouraged to make more
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efficient choices. The effects of this manipulation were mixed: The "reward"
manipulation failed to increase choice efficiency, though the "cost" manipulation did. In
hindsight, this may be due to the competing demands placed on participants with the
introduction of the "reward" manipulation: The instructions encouraged them to make
better choices faster may, which may have simultaneously encouraged deliberation and
information seeking as well as speed. Conversely, the "cost" manipulation may have
increased speed at the cost ofconsideration. Further, I note that whenever "raw" and
"discounted" objective quality (a separation that existed only for the "cost" manipulation)
differed, in all cases the "raw" quantity provided stronger support for the hypothesis in
question. This indicates that decision-makers were more focused on the objective quality
of the choice itself, and less focused on the quality they would personally receive if they
chose it. This also provides evidence for the weakness of the "cost" manipulation,
suggesting that future research into motivating efficient choice should consider utilizing
additional motivation strategies.
One effect of this weak manipulation was weak support for Hypothesis 2d, which
predicted that motivation to choose would lead to choices being better, operationalized as
finding stronger support for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c when choice was motivated,
despite the fact that the choices were being made more quickly. There was only
piecemeal support for these predictions: The "reward" manipulation led to a more rapid
increase in the correspondence between subjective ratings and objective values, but the
"cost" manipulation did not. However, the cost manipulation did lead to faster choice
(Hypothesis Ie), and neither efficiency manipulation led to worse choices: The lack of
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interactions, while unfortunate, also indicates that the effects shown in Study 1 and
replicated in Study 2 are robust against manipulations such as these. While the
manipulations themselves may have been less than ideal, they undeniably added a cost to
delay or a reward for choosing faster, and Hypotheses 1 and 2 were robust against these
costs and rewards.
Hypothesis 2e, which predicted that the slope of the options viewed would lead to
differences in the likelihood of an option being chosen, was not directly supported. This
may be a methodological artifact of the design of the study: As participants had no idea
what distribution of options to expect, those experiencing a positive (or negative) slope
had no reason to expect that the slope would continue to rise (or fall), but may have
worried (hoped) that eventually the trend would crash (bounce back). Prior research on
slopes suggests that the point-slope observed for the chosen option would be a significant
predictor of decisional satisfaction (Hsee & Abelson, 1991), but I did not examine
decisional satisfaction directly in this study, so my results do not conflict with Hsee and
Abelson's. My exploratory analyses, indeed, support their results: The subjective quality
of options (appreciation of an option itself, which mayor may not have been chosen) was
higher for more-positively sloped distributions, and yet higher still when the positive
slope had persisted for some amount of time. This extends Hsee and Abelson's results by
suggesting an underlying process by which decisional satisfaction is increased: People
are more satisfied with options drawn from a positive slope simply because options,
chosen or not, are rated subjectively higher when the slope is higher, even controlling for
the objective values of the options.
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Finally, the individual difference measures once again failed to produce any
reliable effects, as well as any reliable interactions with the efficiency manipulations.
These hypotheses are given a third chance in Study 3, below, and will be reviewed at
greater length in the General Discussion.
Overall, Study 2 did a goodjob of supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, broadly. No
evidence appeared that suggested that waiting to learn about the distribution of options
was harmful to decision-makers, and many pieces of evidence (the replications of
hypotheses also supported in Study 1) suggest that gaining distributional knowledge,
even at some cost, is beneficial and desirable. Study 2 showed also that participants are
sensitive to the slope of the options that they have seen so far (albeit not precisely in the
hypothesized manner), and that the effects of Study 1 remain reliable even when the
decision context is manipulated such that delay has a cost (or lack of delay is rewarded).
Study 2, however, raises some additional questions regarding the generalizability
of Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, over these two studies, using a "reward" of spending study
time as one wishes (rather than doing math problems) produced a set of participants
whose preferences empirically indicated that their preferences were reversed and they
would rather complete math problems. As discussed in Study 1, above, this could be for
several reasons, not the least of which is that participants may have simply preferred to be
helpful during their time as research participants than to fritter it away. While the method
ofreverse-coding objective value for these participants is robust so long as these
correlations actually indicate a preference for completing math problems, this
inconsistency with the expected effect of this paradigm requires replication using a
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different decision. Similarly, the decision itself, albeit "real" in the sense that
participants actually received the option they chose, was not the sort of decision that
these participants (college students) would likely face outside the laboratory. Even
beyond trouble with the specifics of the "free time" versus "math" paradigm, it still
provided only one dimension along which participants could evaluate options. Many real
world decisions are "multi-attribute," meaning that a given option has scores in many
different domains of interest that may contradict each other (Kramer & Hodges, in prep;
Timmermans, 1993). Finally, while Study 2 improved upon Study 1 by allowing each
participant to experience their own distribution (and thus allows generalization of the
replicated effects across many random sequences), Studies 1 and 2 both made use of a
normally distributed set of numbers, while decisions in the real world may be distributed
in many ways. These concerns are addressed in Study 3.
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CHAPTER IV
STUDY 3
Whereas the first two studies are geared towards testing whether people desire
and utilize information about distributions of choices, the decisions tested in these studies
are much simpler than most decisions made by real people in the real world. To address
this, Study 3 extends the two prior studies in two ways. First, it uses a vignette describing
a real-world optimal-stopping problem that many people in the college-student
population have experienced or have had direct experience with: choosing a roommate.
Second, Study 3 extends the prior two studies by allowing for more than one quality
metric: Potential roommates are "good" if they are financially solvent, but also if they are
personable. Many real-world decisions have multiple dimensions on which options can
be evaluated, leading to additional complexity that bears study (Kramer & Hodges, in
prep; Timmermans, 1993).
I still predict to find the same basic processes with this more ecologically valid
vignette-based study: People will wait to gain distributional information, and will still
make use of it. To see if other results from Studies 1 and 2 will replicate in Study 3
requires measurement of the same conceptual variables in Study 3: number ofoptions
seen, subjective ratings of each option, objective ratings of each option, correspondence
ofthe subjective ratings to the objective ratings, and individual difference variables.
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While most of these variables will be measured in the same manner in Study 3,
measuring objective quality provides a unique challenge in a study designed to have no
"objectively correct" choice (in the real world people may reasonably value personability
of a housemate differently than they value the housemate's financial stability, or not).
However, in Study 3, there are still only two cues to the quality of an option that
participants are aware of: personability and financial stability. There is also a rather
impressive literature on clinical versus actuarial decision-making that has shown that,
across training sets, models based on individuals' actual behaviors (i.e., without reference
to a training set) actually"...predict...the external criterion more accurately than [the
individuals]; this was true for each [individual] ...because they do not apply their own
weights consistently" (Grove & Meehl, 1996, p. 316; see also Dawes & Corrigan, 1974).
This is to say, by computing a linear model for each participant predicting their
subjective quality ratings from the value of each cue, I should be able to predict the
external criterion (in this case, an idiographic metric of "objective quality") better than
the ratings themselves would for a single given option. As such, I predict that results
found for objective quality in Studies 1 and 2 will replicate using idiographic model-
implied quality (computed separately for each subject) in Study 3.
Of course, there is the distinct possibility that this model-implied choice will be
more accurate for some people than for others. While my predictions regarding
"objective quality" may appear to suffer for this lack of precision, I note that in the prior
studies, "objective quality" was defmed as the number of minutes of free time (versus
math time) that participants would have as part of the study; in Studies 1 and 2, this
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objective quality metric may have varied in precision across participants (some may
have had a stronger preference for one sort of time than the other; indeed, the fact that
some preferred to complete math problems promotes this), the model-implied quality
metric in this study may do so as well. In essence, this also constitutes an interesting
metric for additional study: As participants make their decisions and gather information
about the distribution of options (in Study 3, the joint distribution of the two cues), will
they focus on one cue, or an amalgamation of the two cues into a single "quality"
distribution, or does the tendency to do this depend on individual difference
measurements?
There is a large body of literature on multi-attribute decision-making or
"multiple-cue judgment" (see Karlsson, Juslin, & Olsson, 2008 for a review). Several
process models exist for explaining how multiple-cue judgments are to be made. The
most frequently discussed judgment process for this is referred to as "exemplar memory,"
in which a decision-maker recalls an exemplar (i.e., an item that would be judged as
"ideal"), and then judges an item at hand not directly, but in terms of its similarity to the
exemplar (Juslin, Olsson, & Olsson, 2003). Another, more compensatory strategy for
multiple-cue judgment is a simple additive model: Quality ratings along all cues are
summed, and then the judgment is made corresponding to the sum. People appear to
utilize some modification of one of these two judgment procedures (exemplar or additive)
depending on the task at hand (Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, 2008). However, there is still
a rather marked lack of evidence regarding how people might weight cues when using an
additive judgment strategy: Tversky (1972) suggested that "bad" (less important, less
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differentiating, etc.) cues would simply be dropped in order to clarifY decision-making,
and Dawes and colleagues have built a remarkable case nothing that human judgment
underperforms statistical models in many contexts (e.g., Dawes, 1979; Dawes, Faust, &
Meehl, 1989; Goldberg & Werts, 1966; Grove & Meehl, 1996). Given this, there is
reasonable evidence to expect participants, when offered multiple cues that together
require a single comparative judgment of "quality" be made, will use a compensatory
(e.g., additive) strategy. However, this literature does not address how people seek
information regarding how each cue is distributed across the judgment space: If cues are
to be weighted against each other in any manner, judges likely develop and then utilize a
notion of how "relevant" each cue is. Indeed, the literature on feature-matching in
judgment suggests that people do just this: Any cue which is effectively "irrelevant" in
the sense that options are more or less equivalent on the cue will be "matched" on and
subsequently ignored (Hodges, 1997), indicating that (at least in this extreme case) the
distribution of cues across options affects the weighting ofthe cues themselves. In sum,
this literature does not address the desirability of "knowing the option space" for an
option space defined by multiple cues.
The literature has, however, focused frequently on specific strategies for choosing
among multiple cues in single-shot decisions about options that vary on multiple
dimensions (rather than gaining information about a set of options that vary on more than
one cue). Following the literature on multiple-cue judgment, which shows that people
- - - ... .....
may undertake many strategies for amalgamating cues in order to make a choice
(Karlsson et ai., 2008), I predict that the extent to which participants utilize and aggregate
96
multiple cues (as opposed to ignoring some) will be an individual difference. The key
to this difference, I believe, has to do with the mathematical difficulty of a compensatory
strategy: People are not good at weighting cues against each other, either in the abstract
or in actual decisions; rather, this sort of cue weighting is best left to linear models (at
least, when a training process is available; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). Tversky's
(1972) "Elimination by aspects" theory of choice suggests that people will simply drop
cues from their mental representations of decisions until a dominant option rises to the
top on the remaining cues. Tversky's data and theory suggest that people will attend to
one cue specifically, rather than weighting the cues against each other, while Juslin,
Karlsson, and Olsson (2008) suggest that if cues can be added together, they will be.
As such, this study addresses the possibility that the use of cues (in a decision
where cues could be added) varies as an individual difference: the degree to which
individuals take pleasure in mathematically difficult tasks such as this. Peters and
colleagues' (2006) numeracy research suggests that some individuals are not only better
at mathematical tasks, but also take pleasure in the processing and manipulation of
numbers, suggesting that numeracy should predict the extent to which people actually
utilize (one or both of) the cues provided to them, noting well that Studies 1 and 2 would
caution against making predictions of individual differences predicting decisional
behavior. That said, given the body of research suggesting that (even when they are
unqualified) people prefer to mentally weight cues than to rely on actuarial tables (Dawes
et al., 1989), numeracy should predict the extent to which people utilize the cues
available to them, or utilize an aggregate of cues rather than just one cue.
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I will test the numeracy prediction using the output from the idiographic linear
model I have computed for each participant in order to generate model-implied choice:
Along with calculating model-implied choice for each option viewed by each participant,
I can also examine qualities of each participant's linear model: Specifically, the beta
weights and the R2• I will take the sum of the standardized beta weights for each cue (the
stability cue and the personability cue) as an empirical individual difference variable: the
extent to which participants are using multiple cues. I will also examine each individual's
adjusted R2 for predicting ratings from the value of each cue: This allows me to detect the
extent to which participants' ratings are determined by the cues, which effectively
includes people who underweight one cue to promote the other or use other
noncompensatory strategies. I predict that, for both measures of "cue use," numeracy
will be a positive predictor (showing that numeracy predicts cue use in a continuous
manner).
Study 3 also drops the "mean" and "variance" within-subjects manipulations from
Study 2, as the "roommate" vignette potentially lends itself to cross-decisional learning:
As roommate searches are more "real" and emotionally tinged, it is harder to argue that
participants will be able to "reset" their notion of what counts as a good roommate four
times. Instead, participants are asked to make just two roommate selections, switching
from random scoring of roommates on a normal distribution to the random scoring of
roommates on a uniform distribution. However, Study 3 still allows for a test of whether
distributions with higher variance lead to longer decision-making times, as uniform
distributions have higher variances than normal distributions.
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Hypotheses
Study 3 is expected to replicate the basic findings of Studies 1 and 2, despite the
methodological differences between the studies. This includes all hypotheses which
received support in either Study I or Study 2 (save those referring to differences due to
the "mean" condition). I also retain the specifics of Hypothesis 3, constituting a second
chance for reprisal for the individual difference predictions, which may be more clearly
evidenced via a more naturalistic decision vignette. In sum, my predictions follow, using
the same indices as in the prior studies for parallelism (even though some hypotheses,
noted below, have been dropped or altered); new and heavily altered predictions are in
boldface. I predict:
1. Gaining knowledge of the choice set is desirable.
1a. Quality metrics will not fully mediate the relationship between number of
options seen and likelihood of choosing an option.
(lb. This study drops the prediction that option sets with a higher mean will
show no difference in delay behavior, because the mean of the distribution is not
varied.)
lc. Participants who view a uniform distribution of options will take longer
to choose than those who view a normal distribution, as the uniform distribution
will show a higher variance.
Id. Decision quality and number of options seen will interact positively to predict
how long choice is delayed: Option quality will become a better predictor of choice as
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participants view more options (constituting a positive linear interaction), but this will
taper off as choice is delayed further (constituting a negative quadratic interaction).
2. Gaining knowledge of the option set is useful.
2a. Subjective and model-implied quality metrics will become more similar over
time.
2b. Delay will lead to better choices, but this effect will taper off eventually.
2c. Subjective quality will relate to the relative model-implied quality of proffered
options, over and above the extent to which ratings track the absolute model-implied
quality.
(2d. This study drops the prediction that motivation manipulations will
enhance Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, as no motivation manipulation is used.)
2e. The experienced slope of the model-implied quality of options will predict
whether people choose: Positive slopes will predict delayed choice, negative slopes will
predict quicker choice.
2f. Point-slope will interact with model-implied quality in predicting
subjective quality, showing that a positive slope makes good options seem even
better.
2g. Effects previously shown for "objective quality" will replicate for "model-
implied" quality.
3. Individuals will differ in how they utilize distributional information.
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3a. People who are more averse to making decisions will have more extreme
delaying behavior than those less averse to decisions.
3b. Vigilant decision-makers will delay longer than less vigilant decision-makers,
and delay will be a better predictor of outcome quality for those who are more vigilant.
3c. Maximizers will delay longer than satisficers, but delay will not result in
especially good decisions for maximizers than satisficers (and in fact, satisficers may
make better decisions).
3d. Decision-makers who are more vigilant, less maximizing, and less decision
averse will produce subjective ratings that are closer to the relative objective values of the
option at hand than the less vigilant, more maximizing, and more decision averse,
respectively.
3e. People whose subjective ratings more closely track the relative model-implied
quality of the option at hand will obtain better outcomes.
(3f. This study drops the hypothesis that individual difference effects will be
moderated by motivation to choose quickly, as no motivation is used.)
3g. Those higher in numeracy will be higher in "cue use," i.e., the extent to
which they utilize both of the cues available to them.
3h. Those higher in numeracy will make more consistent choices, indicated as
having a greater proportion ofvariance in subjective ratings of each item explained
by the model-implied quality for that item.
101
Method
Participants
Participants were 55 college students, recruited for a 3D-minute study in the same
manner and from the same pool as participants in Studies 1 and 2.
Procedure
The study was advertised as a half-hour-Iong study. The study procedure was
equivalent in almost all respects to the procedure used in Studies 1 and 2, with a few
exceptions. First, the instructions were changed in order to explain the vignette.
Participants were told that:
Your decision, over the next several pages is to decide which housemate you
would like to have. Imagine that you have a house, which you love, but that a
housemate has moved out and you need someone else to move in so that you can
cover rent. There are no restrictions from the landlord on who this can be--it's
entirely up to you. Furthermore, you have several applicants for the room, all of
whom are different. ... These potential housemates will differ from each other in
two ways--how financially stable they are (someone who is not very stable might
miss utility payments or be late with rent) and how well you get along (or how
"personable" they are).
Emphases were in the actual instructions to participants. Instructions were otherwise the
same, though the display indicating the relative quality of the housemates was also
altered to display housemate quality in a continuous manner, using sliders (see Figure 4).
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iThis is housemate #15. This housemate is:
iSomewhallimmeially stallie--------t•.--------I l'ttoder8tel)· personable
:How good docs this huuscmnte sound to you'?
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Figure 4. Participants' view ofthe decision they were making in Study 3.
As in Study 2, some participants (n = 5) completed the individual difference
measures before participating in the experiment, while the others (n = 46) completed
these measures after making both decisions, as in Study 2. This large difference in the
number of subjects who completed the forms in the "general survey" as opposed to
during the study was due to a lack of students participating in the general survey in the
term during which data was collected. There was also an alert in between decisions (the
first and second decision, constituting the switch from the normal to the uniform
distribution of options or vice versa; these orders were counterbalanced) that read:
Next, we would like you to imagine that you have graduated and have moved to a
new city. You do not know anybody, but you are in the same boat: You have
found a place to live, but need a housemate. Since you're in a new city, you don't
have a good sense of the pool of housemates available. So, your knowledge of
roommates in Eugene may not help you here. Click OK when you are ready to
begin.5
5 Interestingly, while collecting data for Study 3, the author was faced with the inverse
decision: Though an excellent housemate had been found, the author was engaged in a
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When participants had completed the optional stopping problems and the surveys
(note that some participants may have completed the surveys prior to beginning the
study; see above), the study was complete.
Results
The analytic strategy taken in Study 3 was similar to that taken in Study 2.
Exploratory analyses showed that personability and financial stability were widely
considered desirable qualities to have in a housemate, with 94% and 95% of participants
respectively showing a positive relationship between subjective ratings and the roommate
quality. For only one of the three participants who showed a negative relationship for
either stability or personability was this negative relationship statistically significantly
negative (for personability; this individual viewed only two options for each of his two
decisions, making this significant effect quite untrustworthy; removing this participant
did not change any of the reported effects). Due to the small number of participants who
completed the surveys outside of the study (n = 5 is generally considered too small to
produce trustworthy comparisons), differences due to survey administration procedure
are not examined.
Participants' use of cues was fairly consistent (mean std. beta = 0.56 for financial
stability, 0.58 for cue use); participants did not significantly prefer one to the other,
long-distance optimal stopping problem to choose an apartment to rent, effectively
weighting commute time against cost.
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t(49) = -0.32,p = 0.75. Cue use (sum of betas) had M=0.56, sd=0.25; cue use
(adjusted R2) had M=0.69, sd=0.16).
Hypothesis 1: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Desirable
Hypothesis 1a predicted that quality would not fully mediate the relationship
between number of options seen and the likelihood of choosing an option. This was
tested by predicting whether an option was chosen or not from the amount of delay and
the two quality metrics: subjective rating and model-implied quality. This effect
replicated, B = 0.01, z = 2.08, p = 0.04, showing that delay was still a positive predictor
of whether or not an option was chosen, over and above the effect of quality.
Hypothesis 1c predicted that participants would take longer to choose when the
distribution of qualities was uniform rather than normal, as an analog to the earlier
findings regarding how increased variance in quality led to more delay in choice. This
effect was not significant, B = 0.38, z = 1.24,p = 0.21.
Hypothesis 1d predicted that, as participants view more options, the quality of
those options would become a stronger predictor of choice. This is operationalized as a
positive linear interaction and a negative quadratic interaction between decision quality
and the number of options seen in predicting how long a choice is delayed. For subjective
decisions' quality, this effect was significant and positive, as predicted, for the linear
effect of delay, B = 0.01, z = 3.76,p < 0.001, and negative and significant, as predicted,
for the quadratic effect of delay, B = -0.001, z = -4.61 ,p < 0.001. For objective quality,
Study 3, which uses model-implied quality, did indeed show this effect, both in terms of
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the positive linear effect, B = 0.17, z = 3.42,p < 0.001, and a negative quadratic
effect, B = -0.0002, z = -S.70,p < 0.001, replicating what was found in Study 1, but not
Study 2 (where these effects were not present for objective quality).
Hypothesis 2: Gaining Knowledge of the Option Set Is Useful
Hypothesis 2a predicted that subjective and model-implied quality measures
would become more similar over time. Given the differences between "objective" and
"model-implied" quality, which make model-implied quality much more similar to
subjective quality, there may be much less variance in the interaction term (between
subjective quality and amount of delay, in predicting model-implied quality) that tests
this hypothesis. Indeed, in Study 3, this effect was not significant.
Hypothesis 2b predicted that the effect of delay on choice quality would be
positive but taper off. Specifically, a positive linear effect of delay on individual model-
implied quality was predicted, but with an additional negative quadratic effect. As in
Studies I and 2, this effect was examined within levels of the distribution variables (i.e.,
separately for the uniform distribution, and then again for the random distribution). For
model-implied quality, an analogue of "objective quality," for which support was found
for Hypothesis 2b in Study I but not in Study 2, only one effect out of four (a linear and
quadratic effect within each distribution type), was significant: Contrary to predictions,
greater delay predicted lower model-implied quality (i.e., a negative linear effect) for the
uniform distribution, B = -0.003, t = -2.50,p < 0.05. For the uniform distribution the
quadratic effect was positive (also counter to predictions), but not significant. For the
106
normal distribution, the linear effect was nonsignificant but in the right direction,
B = 0.00005, t = 0.07,p > 0.10, and the quadratic effect was marginal and in the right
direction, B = -0.000002, t = -1.66, Pmcmc = 0.10. The same four tests were run for
subjective quality, which showed support for Hypothesis 2b in both Study 1 and Study 2.
Both linear effects were nonsignificant but in the right direction (B's > 0.02,Pmcmc 's >
0.29), and the quadratic effect was marginal but in the correct direction for the normal
distribution, B = -0.0003, t = -1.67,Pmcmc = 0.10, and significantly in the right direction
for the uniform distribution, B = -0.0005, t = -2.12, P < 0.05.
Hypothesis 2c predicted that subjective quality would be correlated with relative
model-implied quality, over and above absolute model-implied quality. This hypothesis
may seem odd or trivial based on the fact that my model-implied quality metric is
generated from subjective quality ratings, however, I note that each option's model-
implied quality is based on the entire set of options viewed and rated. So, for example,
computing the relative model-implied quality for the third option viewed involves
modeling quality based on all options viewed, generating the model-implied quality
(based on all options) for the first, second, and third options, and then examining the z-
score for the third option (relative only to the other two). As such, this still remains a test
ofwhether the relative values (based on choice that has not yet been fully revealed) are
predictive of ratings over and above the absolute values (which are currently being
revealed). As above, because I use quality metrics that are derived from each other in my
model (i.e., as "controls"), this effect should be more difficult to show in Study 3 than
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prior studies, however I did find a significant effect in this study, B = 0.17, t = 2.12,
p < 0.05, despite the use of model-implied quality instead of objective quality.
Hypothesis 2e predicted that positive slopes of objective option quality would
increase the likelihood of choice, while negative slopes would decrease this likelihood.
Slopes were computed the same manner as in Study 2. As in Study 2, no main effect was
found for point-slope in predicting whether or not someone chose, B = 5.88, z = 0.84,
p = 0.40. However, Hypothesis 2e also predicted that point-slope would interact with
model-implied quality in order to predict subjective quality ratings, as was shown via
exploratory analysis in Study 2. This effect was significant in Study 3 as well, B = 38.41,
t = 2.33, p < 0.05, confirming that positive slopes make good options seem subjectively
better. The three-way interaction ofpoint-slope, model-implied quality, and amount of
delay in predicting subjective quality (marginal in Study 2), was significant in Study 3,
B = 15.51, t = 2.1O,p < 0.05, once again indicating that positive slopes make good
options seem even better when more options have been viewed.
Hypothesis 2f predicted that effects involving "objective quality" in prior studies
would replicate using my model-implied quality metric. Indeed, a the results reported
above suggest that they have: Hypotheses 1d, 2b, 2c, and 2e showed the same effects for
model-implied quality as Studies 1 and 2 had shown for objective quality, while only
Hypothesis 2a did not.
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Hypothesis 3: Individuals Will Differ in How They Utilize Distributional
Information
Individual difference measures were given one final try for predicting decision-
making behaviors in Study 3. Once again, the scales showed alphas and correlation
patterns commensurate with prior work (as discussed in Studies 1 and 2 above), though
with slightly lower alphas in some cases (likely due to the smaller sample size in Study
3). As in the earlier two studies, nearly none of the predicted effects were present:
Decision aversion, maximizing tendency, and vigilance did not predict choice quality or
delay (by either measure of decision aversion, either measure of maximizing, either
measure ofquality, or any measure of delay). While some of these effects are
occasionally marginal or significant, fewer than 1 in 20 predicted values were significant
(consistent the significant effects being due to type-I error), none of the significant or
marginal effects replicated across measures of the same construct (e.g., they would be
present for only Schwartz et al.'s 2002 maximizing scale but not Diab et al.'s 2008 scale),
nor did they replicate the seemingly spurious results from Study 1 or Study 2.
The additional hypotheses involving individual differences from Study 3,
however, deserve additional attention: I predicted that those higher in numeracy would
make greater use ofthe cues available (showing a higher mean or sum of the standard
betas extracted from the model-implied quality model; Hypothesis 3g). This was tested
via linear regression using numeracy to predict the sum of the standardized betas from a
linear model predicting each individual's subjective ratings from the personability and
financial stability ratings for each viewed option. This result was not significant,
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B = 0.007, t(48) = l.l2,p = 0.27. However, my final prediction was that the more
numerate would show more consistent preferences-rather than just showing a stronger
relationship between the cues and the criterion, their individual model-implied choice
models would show less error. I tested this by taking the adjusted R2 (adjusted, rather
than raw R2 was used due to the fact that some models had very few options, indicating a
likelihood of overfitting) from each individual's linear model and predicting this value
from their numeracy score, using linear regression. Indeed, numeracy was a positive
predictor of adjusted R2, B = 0.03, t(47) = 2.31,p = 0.02, and remained significant and
positive even when amount of options viewed was added as a control.
Discussion
Study 3 provided support for the two basic hypotheses of this thesis, replicating
the results found in Studies 1 and 2. Study 3's extension of Studies 1 and 2 indicates that
people both seek and benefit from gaining knowledge of a distribution of options in
contexts with real-world appeal, such as finding a roommate. Study 3's results also show
that distributional knowledge is desirable and helpful for a variety of distributions, for
example, normal and uniform distributions. These distribution types were not observed to
differ from each other in any hypothesized way (Hypothesis 1c), though they did show
slightly different patterns of support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. For example, Hypothesis
2b, which examined the effect of delay on quality separately within each distribution,
showed a significant negative linear effect for the uniform distribution for objective
quality (though there were no effects of objective quality in Study 2), whereas the normal
distribution did not show this counter-hypothesized effect.
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Study 3 also replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 even though Study 3
utilized quality metrics on two dimensions (both personability and financial solvency). In
other words, we find that choices are still (marginally) better, according to direct ratings
by participants and linear models built from the participants' many ratings, when
participants delayed more (Hypothesis 2b), even though participants had to attend to two
distributions of option quality. This means that the desirability and utility of gaining
distributional information is present even for multi-attribute choices.
Not everybody makes the same use of the multiple cues, however: Those higher
in numeracy made better use of the cues, as their subjective ratings were more accurately
predicted by their model-implied choice than those who were less numerate. It is possible
that this could explain the failure in Study 3 to replicate the "learning effect" whereby
subjective ratings grew closer to objective quality in Studies I and 2. To explore this, an
additional analysis added an interaction of numeracy with Hypothesis 2a, allowing a test
of whether the relationship between time and the correspondence between subjective
rating and model-implied quality was higher for the more numerate. However, this
interaction was also not significant.
Study 3's results also extend many findings of Studies I and 2 by showing that
the result holds for hypothetical tasks of greater ecological relevance: Study 3 examined a
task participants may have had experience with (roommate choice); at the very least, it is
likely that most participants (who were college students) would have at least discussed
the perils of roommate choice with peers. This is notable because it extends the findings
of Studies I and 2 not only in a more ecologically relevant direction, but also replicates
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the findings using a completely different quality metric: These effects are present
when participants are judging and deciding among hypothetical roommates as well as
when they are judging and deciding among how much time to actually (non-
hypothetically) spend completing math problems.
Study 3 also replicated the many results of Studies 1 and 2 that dealt with
objective quality by using a model-implied quality metric (Hypothesis 2g) -not only are
participants obtaining higher-quality outcomes when they delay choice somewhat, but
these outcomes are more consistent with the preferences they reveal over multiple ratings
(whether or not these ratings are consistent or whether they are aware of them), by
examining idiographically defined quality metrics (i.e., model-implied quality).
Study 3 replicated results from Study 2 regarding the relationship between the
slope of option sets and peoples' perceptions of quality (Hypotheses 2e and 2f): When
options are "getting better," people like the options more, over and above the effect of the
options being "good" in an absolute sense.
Individual differences in Study 3, however, found largely the same fate as they
did in Study 2: inconsistent and sporadic support (if any). This third failure to appear in
three separate data sets across both hypothetical and non-hypothetical decisions about
multiple topics shows least consistency of the unreliability of these relationships. This is
discussed in greater detail in the General Discussion below.
112
CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Overview
Over the course of three studies, I have shown consistent support for two basic
hypotheses regarding the manner in which human decision makers form judgments
regarding the options available to them: That people delay choice in order to gain
knowledge of how the options available to them are distributed, and that doing so is
potentially advantageous. People seek to view additional options when they are available,
and this viewing appears to lead to learning distributional qualities of the options which
people then appear to utilize in their evaluations of each individual option to which they
are exposed: They continue to view options early on, not solely relying on the quality of
the options they see (Hypothesis la, supported in all studies), they view more options
when the option set is variable (Hypothesis 1c, supported for the low-mean condition in
Studies 1 and 2), and as more options are viewed, the quality of the options becomes a
stronger determinant of whether options are chosen (Hypothesis 1d, for subjective quality
ofoptions in all studies, objective quality of options in Study 1, and model-implied
quality of options in Study 3).
People also gain a better understanding of the distribution of options as they view
more options, as evidenced by a greater correspondence between subjective ratings and
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objective quality as additional options are viewed (Hypothesis 2a, supported in
Studies 1 and 2 but not using model-implied quality in Study 3)-this provides evidence
that people are indeed learning the distribution as they view more options (whether or not
learning the distribution is an explicit goal). This provides a nice parallel to Hypothesis
2b, which predicted that those who view more choices (up to a point of diminishing
returns) would end up with better outcomes, from both an objective and subjective
perspective. For objective quality, this result was weakly supported in Study 1, replicated
in Study 2, and conceptually replicated in Study 3 (using model-implied quality). For
subjective quality, this result was supported in Studies 1 and 3 (but not in Study 2).
As additional evidence for the claim that distribution learning leads to better
outcomes, Hypothesis 2c predicted that the relative value of viewed options would be a
determinant of subjective quality over and above the effect of objective quality. This
result was significant in all three studies, indicating that participants were sensitive not
only to the ground-zero objective quality of each choice, but also to the relative objective
values. This result dovetails with Hypothesis 1b (supported in Study 1, but not Study 2,
and untested in Study 3), which predicted that the absolute objective value of the options
offered would not even matter, though Study 2 suggests that at least in some cases the
objective value does matter (such that people delay more when the mean is higher). If
participants are more likely to choose items that are excellent relative to the history of
items seen, it is difficult to argue that the history of options viewed is having absolutely
no effect on participants. Finally, I showed that participants whose eventual choices were
objectively better were affected by the slope of the options they had seen-options that
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were good and carne from a positively-sloped distribution were rated as subjectively
yet-better than options that were less good or which carne from a less-positive (or
negative) slope (Hypothesis 2e, tested and supported in Studies 2 and 3). These effects
are present both within and between subjects (the hypotheses were supported between-
subjects in Study 1 and replicated within-subjects in Studies 2 and 3), using both
hypothetical and real decisions (the hypotheses were supported using real decisions in
Studies 1 and 2 and replicated using hypothetical deCisions in Study 3). In this chapter, I
will discuss the implications of this research, limitations of this research, and proposed
future work to extend this research.
Implications
The most notable implication of the work described here is that delay, specifically
decisional delay, may in some cases be wise. The literature on procrastination and
decisional procrastination has illustrated the dangers of delaying actions and decisions,
but to date without addressing the other possibility-that it may sometimes be wise to do
so. One instance in which it may be wise to do so is in order to gain a better
understanding of the distribution of possible options. In many real-world decisions,
decision-makers are posed with the option of waiting to view additional options, perhaps
at some cost (e.g., an opportunity cost such as risk oflosing currently available options).
This dissertation suggests that before the distribution of options is known, people will
seek to learn it, and this delay may (for some decisions) lead to better outcomes,
ostensibly due to a more nuanced notion of what counts as a "good" option.
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In the studies in this dissertation, I generated random sequences ofoptions
pulled from various distributions, including normal and uniform distributions, with
varying means and variances. Evidence that participants effectively "learned" the
distribution comes from examining the extent to which their subjective ratings of how
good the options were vary as they view additional options. For example, I show that
these subjective ratings corresponded more to objective values as additional options are
viewed, and to relative objective values over and above the absolute objective value,
derived either from the structure of the decision task or from a model of the participants'
preferences revealed by rating all of the options each participant viewed. As participants
viewed more options, their subjective ratings more closely approximated the objective
values, indicating that they were internalizing the relative quality of the options-
effectively, learning how "good" an option is relative to the other options they saw
available to them.
This work extends several threads in the decision-making literature. Corbin and
colleagues (1975) showed some tentative effects of distributional slope and variability-
that people are more likely to wait for a third option if the first two options are similar
than if they are dissimilar. My results, in contrast, show that more variability of viewed
options leads to more delay. This could be for two reasons: My participants had up to 100
options to view, while Corbin and colleagues' participants had only five; Corbin and
colleagues also rewarded their participants only for choosing the best option, while my
participants (in Studies 1 and 2) received the option they selected, thus receiving simply
the reward associated with that particular option (as is more frequently the case in
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everyday decisions). Corbin and colleagues' results may suggest, however, that my
participants were sensitive only to big jumps, or choice patterns in which one option
greatly exceeds the prior option. However, this process would produce a choice pattern
fully determined by option quality, and not the amount of delay--evidence in favor of
Hypothesis 1a contradicts this. While direct comparisons of the success ofmy
participants to those in Corbin and colleagues' research are not possible, the fact that
participants who delayed some (but not too much) attained better outcomes in the current
studies suggests that decisional delay is fruitful for more ecologically valid decisions.
Dhar (1997) also discussed waiting in order to view more options. Dhar's studies
involved having participants view several options, and examined what composition of
options led participants to wait for more options at greater rates. Dhar's explanations,
however, operated at the level of the options available to participants-he did not address
the possibility that participants were viewing the options available as markers of the sort
ofoptions one could hope for by delaying. For example, when participants viewed one
superior option and one inferior option, delaying choice was less likely than when two
equal (but superior) options were available. As such, my results extend his by offering a
broader explanation for why people seek a "no-choice option": A high-variability option
set leads to delayed choice, because it indicates to participants that there may be better
things to come. Like Corbin and colleagues' study, a simple "one option stands out"
explanation for Dhar's results does not explain the results shown in Hypothesis la-that
amount of delay is significant over and above the effect of objective and subjective
quality.
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In a broader sense, I have shown that people desire more information about
the options available to them. This is consistent with Shafir's work on framing effects
(Shafir, 1993; Tversky & Shafir, 1992): Shafir shows that options with reasons for
selecting them (and rejecting them) are more likely to be selected (and rejected) than less
"enhanced" options. This suggests that people prefer options about which they have more
information. An interesting test of the hypothesis that information (and perhaps feeling
informed) is the key would be to compare Shafir's "impoverished" option to an option
"enhanced" with irrelevant information.
The work of Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007) could also be informed by these
studies: They examine how indecisiveness interacts with the riskiness of the choice set in
order to predict decisional delay and quality of choice. These results could be explained
in delay-for-information terms by simply noting that those who delayed choice ended up
with better options, as I have shown for additional decision contexts. Patalano and
Wengrovitz showed that indecisive individuals behaved the same in "risky" and "no-risk"
conditions, while more decisive individuals modulated their decisions in accordance with
the risk of losing a good option. When Patalano and Wengrovitz tailored their decision to
have the ideal choice occur later in the choice set, effectively rewarding risk-taking, they
found that less indecisive individuals benefitted. They used the same individual
difference measures of decisiveness as the current studies, but with a median split to
define groups as "decisive" and "indecisive." This could partially explain their success at
finding that individual differences exist, although in most cases median splits lead to
spurious results when they conflict with continuous analyses (c.f. Howell, 2008; Judd,
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McClelland, & Ryan, 2009). Even so, an exploratory analysis examining median and
lower-quartile splits on decision aversion (to mimic Patalano and Wengrovitz's
technique) did not produce a difference in decision delay for those who were more
decision-averse (by either measure).
As discussed in the Introduction, the Indecisiveness scale (Frost & Shows, 1993)
is also arguably a measure of compulsive decision aversion rather than simple inability to
decide: Patalano and Wengrovitz's results may indicate that those who are unable to
decide simply don '{ decide, and that for those above the median on this scale, the "simply
don't" was not affected by the risk manipulation in their course-choice paradigm. Thus,
the indecisive people fared better, because the best option was designed to appear at the
end. If there is more at work, however, my research suggests a further question: What
leads people to delay? Patalano and Wengrovitz's research (more so than mine) was able
to predict likelihood of delaying from some (but not all) measures of decision aversion as
an individual difference variable (see Limitations, below), but an articulation of two
kinds of indecisiveness---decision avoidance versus information seeking-may provide a
more nuanced framework for their paradigm (see also Anderson, 2003). Perhaps some of
the "indecisives" who achieve better outcomes do so because they are seeking
information, rather than avoiding choice. Whether this practice is wise would then
depend on factors regarding the precise decision being made: what the cost of waiting is,
whether the decision-maker learns the distribution quickly (or correctly), and of course
whether better options would be available to those who wait.
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This work also bears some implication for researchers of delay in general.
Taken in a broad light, my studies have shown that participants seek (and may benefit
from) delaying choice in order to gain additional information about the options available
to them. While my study focused specifically on gaining information about the
distribution of options, any scenario in which gained information could be used or useful
could constitute a similarly wise reason for delay. Some researchers have examined delay
as a means for deciders to gain more information about already available options (rather
than to explore additional options), suggesting that not all information that might be
sought is necessarily wise: Bastardi and Shafir (1998) showed that the mere act of
delaying led delayers to over-rely on the information gained via delay. However, this
finding suggests these participants are not just "spinning their wheels" or looking for
reasons to wait. Whereas Tykocinski and Ruffle (2003) show evidence that people do
indeed simply prefer to wait, Bastardi and Shafir's results indicate further that
participants rely on the information gained via delay. This information affects their
choice inappropriately, as participants given this information up front (i.e., without
having to delay, and also without being given the option to delay) make choices that are
less based on the information. Other research has suggested the same thing: Gaining (or
just having) information leads people to rely on it to a fault (Dawes, 1975; 1994).
Together, this suggests that the "wisdom of waiting" may depend on whether the
information gained is appropriate or wise to rely upon, and also how well it is used.
The literature on procrastination may also need to be updated to account for these
results. Notably, there may be reasons for delaying action that are not inherently bad, and
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good things (in some cases) do corne to those who wait. Definitions of procrastination
that inherently presume that delaying action (of any sort) is unwise should take heed of
the case of delaying decisions, which counts as an instance of delaying action, and thus
sometimes counts as at least one instance of beneficial "delay." If delay is not assumed to
be inherently negative, then the question for procrastination researchers would be how to
define "procrastination" in a non-circular manner: One cannot call an action
"procrastinated," for the purposes of research, without the person delaying action
believing, before the delay, that the delay will lead to no good. To do otherwise is to call
wise delays "procrastination" until they have proven themselves beneficial (or to be
unable to call anything "procrastination" a priori). Many procrastination researchers have
avoided this pitfall by studying only actions that cornmon wisdom shows (and thus the
participants themselves likely believe) to be a bad idea to delay, such as signing up for
classes (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Tice & Baumeister, 1997). Requiring the
expectation that delay lead to poorer outcomes was made explicit by Steel (2007),
although even his explicicitness also poses problems: Many so-called "procrastinators"
and those who delay to their detriment do not, in fact, expect to be worse off for delay.
The planning fallacy (Buehler et aI., 1994) illustrates one example of people in general
over-delaying in a manner often called "procrastination" but under circumstances where
they have no expectation of the delay leading to poorer outcomes. Similarly, many people
may believe (or fear) that delaying a certain action will be harmful, even when there is no
evidence that delay will hurt the particular action they must complete. In my studies,
participants were not normatively worse-off for waiting (because option quality was
121
randomly generated), but I still showed a positive linear effect for delay on quality
(indicating that delay is overall helpful) as well as a negative quadratic effect (indicating
that delay becomes less helpful eventually). While I do not argue that delay is an
inherently a good idea, I argue that it is not an inherently bad one; this means that the
findings in the procrastination literature may not apply to the delay ofaction in general.
Rather, if the study of procrastination is limited to actions that participants believe to be
disadvantageous to delay, then it cannot be generalized to delaying action in general,
which may show that a "wait a bit ...but not too long" strategy would lead to the best
outcomes. Prior procrastination research has selected methodologies almost entirely
designed to produce poorer outcomes when participants wait (c.f. Ariely & Wertenbroch,
2002; Tice & Baumeister, 1997), and has not analyzed "amount of delay" either in a
continuous manner or with a quadratic component.
Another implication is the inconsistency of results found for subjective and
objective measures of option quality. Though highly correlated, these measures
occasionally behaved differently in terms of predicting choice processes and choice
quality. For example, Hypothesis 1d predicted that "quality" would become a stronger
predictor of whether an option is chosen as more options had been viewed (and then taper
off); this was supported for subjective quality in all studies, but not so consistently for
objective quality. Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that quality of the option eventually
chosen would increase for narticinants who delaved (and then t:mer off): this WllS well-
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supported for objective quality in Studies 1 and 2 (and untested in Study 3), but received
the weakest support for subjective quality, which was marginal in Study 1 and
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nonsignificant in Studies 2 and 3. These inconsistencies are likely due to an effect
observed in Hypothesis 2a: That subjective and objective quality are collinear, but that
they become more highly related as additional options are viewed. Hypotheses 1d and 2b
(mentioned above) both examine linear and quadratic effects of delay on quality, which
might explain the inconsistency: The act of choosing is, perhaps unsurprisingly, more
strongly influenced by subjective quality than by objective quality. However, it is
objective quality that differentiates those who have waited to choose from those who
chose early. This can be explained by noting that the two models were different:
Hypothesis 1d looked at every option chosen or rejected, in order to model what predicts
choosing. This analysis was conducted within subjects, indicating that when an option
has a higher subjective quality for the individual in question (eliminating noise due to the
fact that people use Likert scales differently), choice is more likely; however, as objective
quality varied randomly within subjects, some objectively excellent options may have
been passed over during the learning phase (i.e., before subjective and objective quality
had grown close together; c.f. Hypothesis 2a), reducing the predictive power of objective
quality in the model for Hypothesis 1d. In the results for Hypothesis 2b, which examined
quality of only the chosen option, more variance was present in how the scale was used
(as this was measured between-subjects in Study 1 and with much less within-subjects
data in Studies 2 and 3), reducing the predictive power of subjective quality across
people. Objective quality was measured in the same units for all participants, so it did not
become more "noisy" for the same reason. In fact, the opposite may have occurred:
Because only chosen options were modeled in my tests ofHypothesis 2b, the within-
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subjects variance in objective quality was also ignored-if a person ignored an option
of "25 minutes of free time" three times before eventually realizing that 25 is a relatively
"good" number, and then choose it the fourth time it came up, this would show up only as
a "25" in a model of "quality of chosen options," rather than showing up as an effect akin
to rejecting a "25" three times then choosing it once in a model of "whether an option
will be chosen."
A larger question, however, is what conclusions one is to draw from the apparent
lack of individual differences in predicting many aspects of the delay of decisions. Across
three studies, results for individual differences were inconsistent or entirely absent. One
possible explanation for this is that the individual difference measures I used did not
function as expected (i.e., that they failed to measure the construct in question in a valid
manner). Notably, these measures did show the same intra- and inter-measure
relationships as they had in prior work, suggesting that they were at least reliable: The
two maximizing scales correlated significantly, the two decision aversion scales
correlated significantly, and these scales all had internal consistencies consistent with the
papers that presented them. This correlation structure indicates that, in my study, these
scales were similar constructs to the ones measured in the original papers.
However, the scales might still lack some validity in terms of being general
measures of the construct of decision aversion, indecisiveness, or decisional
procrastination. Frost and Sho\vs (1993) designed their scale in order to measure
procrastination, sub-clinical levels of obsessive-compulsive disorder, and hoarding
tendency; they then argued that the scale was valid on that basis. The scale was also
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shown to predict how long people spent making decisions; the metric for "taking
longer" to make a choice was a reaction-time measure of choice between various things:
clothing articles, courses to take, restaurant menus, or free-time activities. Over all
comparisons, indecisive people took 60% longer to decide. However, as discussed in the
Introduction above, taking more time to decide may involve considering more
information or considering that information more carefully - simply taking more time is
not the same as procrastination, and is not necessarily negative.
Furthermore, Frost and Shows' (1993) scale items conflate information seeking
with decision aversion: those who self-identifY as "putting off' making decisions (item 1
on the scale) are likely owning up to a decisional procrastination tendency, with those
who disagree that they" ... always know what they want" (item 2) or may do so because
they are careful choosers. Item 3 asks participants whether they find it "easy" to make
decisions, conflating the scale with a third construct: ease of making decisions. Some
people may simply find decision-making difficult because they carefully consider every
decision they make, without necessarily delaying choice in order to do so.
My studies also use this scale to predict delay of choice when participants were
given a reason to delay-to seek better options. This sort of delay is very different from
the seconds-spent-choosing method used to show validity of the Indecisiveness scale. In
sum, it is possible that validity concerns due to undermeasurement of the
"Indecisiveness" constrllct could ha've led to my failure to find relationships bet"veen
indecisiveness, decision delay, and outcome quality in an optimal stopping paradigm. I
also note that this measure, which purports to measure a trait, showed mean-level
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differences between participants who completed the questionnaire as part of my study
and participants who completed the questionnaire as part of the unrelated General
Survey, with participants self-reporting themselves as less indecisive in the "study"
version of the questionnaire than in the General Survey. This inconsistency did not
contradict any of my hypotheses, nor did it interact with any relationships I hypothesized,
but this nevertheless provides evidence that the construct itself is measuring more than
trait-level indecisiveness.
The other measure of decisional procrastination, the "Decisional Procrastination"
subscale ofthe MDMQ (Mann et al., 1997, see p. 12 for scale items) is much shorter, and
used differently troublesome items. Though this scale honestly admits to being designed
to measure decisional procrastination (and thus excuses itself from failing to measure
beneficial delay), 40% of the five scale items pertain to procrastination of action rather
than decisions ("Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting upon it") or judgments
regarding the effect of delay rather than delay itself ("I delay making decisions until it is
too late,"). The six-item "vigilance" subscale ofthe MDMQ, rather, attempts to model
careful delay directly, but leaves aside the question of delay: People may "like to
consider / find out the disadvantages of all of the alternatives" (items 1 and 2) or "like to
collect a lot of information" (item 4) but be unwilling to commit time in order to examine
alternatives; others may "try to be clear about their objectives before choosing" or "take a
lot of care before choosing" (items 5 and 6), but whether this requires any marked time
commitment likely varies by person and by decision topic. This scale, like the decisional-
procrastination scale, also suffers conflation of the decision task and judgments regarding
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the process: Careful people may "consider how to best carry out the decision" (item
3), but not delay once it is time to decide. Indeed, the fact that these two scales both
purport to measure subconstructs of decision delay but are reported in Mann and
colleagues' (1997) paper as correlating significantly at r = -0.32 raises some suspicion.
One could also argue that decision-aversion scales may have been poorly chosen
as they only measure the negative part of decisional delay, however, the result that these
were nonpredictive of how long decisions took is still fairly concerning: Those who are
high in decision aversion should have found choosing aversive in my studies (which
undeniably involved making "decisions"), and thus would be expected to avoid or
procrastinate choice (either by choosing hastily or by dawdling). Together, this suggests
that these scales may not yet be ideally suited for measuring decision aversion or delay
for a paradigm such as mine.
If these constructs were correctly (or at least adequately) measured, then the
question of why they failed to relate in the predicted way is harder to answer. Patalano
and Wengrovitz (2007) showed no significant main effect of indecisiveness on decision
delay, but they did show an interaction with their "risk" variable: Indecisive individuals
were not affected by their "risk" manipulation, while decisive individuals were. I take
special notice of the first result: that the indecisive did not, overall, delay longer than the
decisive. This is the same null result that I found in all three of my studies, indicating a
decisional procrastination scales did not directly predict delay of decisions. Patalano and
Wengrovitz's (2007) results also used a median-split approach, treating the 50% of
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participants with the highest indecisiveness scores as "indecisive" and the others as
"decisive," which is widely considered to be an analytic technique that reduces power
overall while increasing the likelihood of "capitalizing on chance" (Judd, Ryan, &
McClelland, 2009). I note, however, that Hypothesis 3f from the current Study 2 was
based on their findings, and designed to produce a conceptual replication of their work:
Individual difference effects (such as decision aversion) would be enhanced when
decision-makers were motivated to choose quickly (an analog to the "risk" manipulation
of Patalano and Wengrovitz). Though this hypothesis was considered to lack support due
to widely inconsistent findings, one of the few "significant" results (rendered
insignificant once controlling for family-wise alpha error) found was the exact opposite
ofPatalano and Wengrovitz's: The more decision-averse were marginally more affected
by the "cost" manipulation than those who were less decision-averse, whereas Patalano
and Wengrovitz's result which showed that indecisive individuals were less sensitive to
their risk manipulation. Further, this result in my study was marginal only for the
MDMQ's Decision Procrastination scale (Mann et aI., 1997)-not Frost and Shows'
(1993) indecisiveness scale, whereas Patalano and Wengrovitz showed their result for the
latter scale and a null result for the former. This result is consistent only with the
inconsistency that seems to occur more often than would be desired with this set of
individual difference measures.
A similar set of arguments can be made for the measures ofmaximizing tendency
that I used: Diab and colleagues (2008) provide an eloquent (albeit scathing) critique of
the classic Schwartz and colleagues (2002) maximizing scale, and do a considerable
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amount of work to produce a more psychometrically sound scale; however, evidence
that their scale is more reliable does little to make a case for validity. In fact, their scale
correlated with only one of the scales that the original scale did (suggesting only
divergent validity), and with only two of five behavioral measures of maximizing; it also
showed mean-level differences between participants who completed the measure as part
of my study versus the unrelated "General Survey" (those who took the General Survey
were more oriented towards satisficing than those who completed the measure during the
study, according to Diab and colleagues' scale but not Schwartz and colleagues' scale),
raising the same validity questions as discussed above for the Indecisiveness scale.
Further, though the construct of "maximizing" versus "satisficing" is easy to define, it is
not clear how exactly the construct of maximizing should be applied. Patalano and
Wengrovitz (2007) point out some trouble with use of the construct in the realm of
"decision delay" quite nicely (albeit unintentionally): They argue that one reason that
maximizers delay less than satisficers in their study is that the maximizers have a low
notion of what an "optimal" choice is, while the satisficers have an oddly high "good
enough" cutoff. Indeed, someone anywhere on the maximizing/satisficing continuum
could easily make the same choice (choose the same option, after the same amount of
delay) as someone on the opposite side ofthe continuum, with one person arguing that
they believed the option chosen to be "maximal" while the other argues that he or she
chose it because it was simply "good enough." The theory behind satisficing as a
strategy, rather, relies heavily on satisficers determining a cutoff value a priori and then
following it: Simon's (1955; 1956) work utilized a formal set of rules and showed that
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these rules were rational within reasonable bounds, while other researchers have
shown that human judges are loath to trust anything important to a formalized rule
(Dawes, 1994). Validity studies involving these scales have never, to my knowledge,
examined the extent to which those who score in the "satisficing" range have such cutoffs
in mind while deciding, nor whether satisficers habitually choose the first option that
exceeds this cutoff (choosing this option even if it is the first option, choosing this option
across all domains from purchasing new homes to purchasing sandwiches, etc.). In sum,
it is possible that these scales (and the decision-aversion scales) failed to predict choice
delay or quality in my studies because the scales lacked some validity.
Another possible explanation for the inconsistency of these results is one
pertaining to the experimental methodology. Given that the studies at hand were
conducted in a laboratory environment with clear instructions regarding study methods, it
could be that these methods left little room for individual differences to affect choice
behavior. This explanation is plausible, though the three studies presented here do
produce a reasonable amount of variation in study methods. However, the optimal
stopping paradigm or range of options may also have reduced the ability for individual
differences to express themselves. For example, one could view the studies reported here
as "guess the best" challenges, rather than decisions, which may have circumvented
individual differences regarding decision-making style. If these individual differences are
onlv expressed when the decision-maker has the subjective exnerience of "making a
.. .... oJ ~ 0
decision," then they would only be expressed in instances of "choosing," rather than
"rejecting." Similarly, the "choose or reject" methodology, which required that
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participants actively push a button labeled with their choice, may have more closely
resembled a series of decisions (one choose/reject decision for each option) than a single
decision (of which option to choose). If so, then individual differences expected to have
an effect on each choice, which may not necessarily have translated into delay for the
larger meta-decision. While these possibilities do not challenge the results shown in
Hypothesis 1 and 2, they may serve to explain why the individual difference effects were
so weak.
A final, and perhaps more likely explanation for the consistent inconsistency of
my individual difference results is drawn from the specific predictions I have made: I am
predicting behavioral outcomes based on individual differences. This is exactly the sort
of prediction that has led many researchers to malign the very study of individual
differences: Trait-like measures of personality do a very poor job of predicting single
behaviors (Mischel, 1968), with correlations frequently being less than .2 in magnitude.
This implies that the correlations I observed, though small, may be reliable-this
effectively implies that sample size may be a concern. Studies 1 and 2 had an n of around
100, while Study 3 had an n of only 55; for n = 108, a correlation would only be
significant if it exceeded 0.18. As such, I conducted a set of exploratory analyses in
which I combined the data from all three studies to re-examine these individual
differences: Subjective ratings, objective quality, and amount of delay were standardized
within each experiment /condition cell, and hierarchical models were used to account for
the fact that some participants (those in Studies 2 and 3) completed more than one
decision; this resulted in a total of 624 decisions made by 144 participants.
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This aggregated data set was then used to re-test some of my individual
difference hypotheses. Hypothesis 3a, that those averse to decision-making will be more
extreme in terms of delay, found support: This was significant using the MDMQ
Decision Procrastination scale, B = 0.23, Z = 2.08, p = 0.04, and marginal for the
Indecisiveness scale, B = 0.10, Z = 1.92, p = 0.055. Additional analyses examining length
(rather than extremity) of delay showed positive but non-significant results, indicating
that extremity is the variable of interest, which in turn indicates that hasty and prolonged
choice are both possible outcomes of indecisiveness: Those averse to decisions either
delay a long time, or they choose hastily. Hypothesis 3b predicted that more vigilant
decision-makers would delay longer or attain better outcomes. When controlling for
decision aversion, this hypothesis was not significant using the aggregated data set.
Hypothesis 3c predicted a null or negative effect of maximizing on outcome quality and a
positive effect of maximizing on delay; out of the eight analyses that tested this
hypothesis (due to multiple measures of maximizing, quality, and delay), only two were
significant. Those higher on the Diab and colleagues (2008) measure of maximizing
showed significantly higher delay and also significantly higher extremity of delay
(although this effect was positive only in Study 1, slightly negative in Study 2, and very
close to zero in Study 3), lending tentative support to this hypothesis and supporting Diab
and colleagues' arguments that Schwartz and colleagues' (2002) scale may not be a very
good measure of maximizing tendency (results on the Schwartz scale were in the same
direction as the Diab scale, but non-significant;p's > 0.30 in all studies and in aggregate).
Hypothesis 3d and 3e concerned predictions of sensitivity to the distribution, though I
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was unable to aggregate this variable across studies as the differences in distribution
indicate that the "sensitivity" variable has a fundamentally different meaning across
distributions and studies.
Thus, in some cases, my hypotheses obtained support, but only when the sample
size was increased to a level able to detect weak effects. There is some danger, however,
in the process of combining data from several studies into a single analysis-the studies
differed in terms of their methods, the decisions made by participants, and the
distributions viewed, though this aggregation treated these potential effects as either
random or nonexistent. As such, the question of whether the metrics from the diverse
studies are inherently comparable is a valid one; future work on the topic is encouraged
(especially for those who have the ability to recruit many subjects or to examine many
decisions for each)
My additional hypotheses regarding individual differences included a prediction
that more numerate individuals would make better choices-this did not pan out, though I
did show evidence that numerate individuals had a significantly higher adjusted R2 for
predicting subjective ratings from model-implied quality than the less numerate. This
indicates that more numerate individuals' subjective ratings are more strongly determined
by their underlying (i.e., revealed) preferences than the subjective ratings of those who
are less numerate. This is consistent with prior research on numeracy (e.g., Peters and
colleagues, 2006)~ v.rhich shov/s these indi"Tiduals to be more comfortable vvith (and
competent at) making use ofnumbers. This result has implications for anybody who
studies decision-making or decision satisfaction using subjective ratings ofdecision
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quality. Ratings produced via Likert-scale "subjective quality" queries such as those
that I used are noisy measures of subjective quality, and further, the precision of these
estimates varies as a function of numeracy: Subjective quality measures are predictably
heteroscedastic, such that the error is not random, but rather is a function of numeracy.
In sum, the individual differences hypotheses were not well supported, though an
aggregation across all three studies provided a large enough sample size to suggest that
some may indeed be valid. Further research is needed to test these hypotheses via
methodologies that allow for higher power. None of the sub-hypotheses of Hypothesis 3,
that individuals will differ in terms of their distribution-learning processes and their use
of distributional information, were actively disproven; and only more research can
answer whether the hypotheses involving individual differences are correct.
Together, the results of this set of studies imply that, when humans can delay
choice in order to gain a better knowledge of the set of options from which they are
choosing, humans (in some contexts) do indeed wait. I have also shown evidence that this
sort of decisional delay is sometimes adaptive, in the sense that some amount of delay
leads to better outcomes for some decisions, but also disconfirmed the implicit hypothesis
in much of the procrastination literature (decisional and otherwise) that delaying choice is
inherently dangerous or harmful. These results suggest that whether to wait before
choosing is a real and valid question-almost everyone does, and it sometimes helps.
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Limitations
This set of studies does contain some flaws, however. First and foremost, it
utilized only one decision-making paradigm: optimal stopping. While I believe that this
paradigm offers a great amount of insight into decision-making processes through its
apparent relation to many real-world decision tasks, multi-trait and multi-method
approaches are inherently more desirable.
The first limitation of my paradigm is that the methods used here never had
participants choose among several options that were all simultaneously available: The
only options available to participants at anyone point were to "choose" or "reject,"
whereas many real-world decisions involve a choice among many options at each time
point. For example, in a more ecologically valid roommate-choice study, one might
interview roommates all week, telling them all, "I'll let you know on Friday." This sort of
approach would be better represented by an optimal stopping paradigm in which options
become unavailable stochastically. Patalano and Wengrovitz (2007) do this in their
"course sign-up" paradigm, in an effort to more closely model the way that courses are
chosen. However, their study used only one fixed set of courses at each timepoint-and
the set of courses was designed beforehand to produce certain outcomes, while their
participants (students, all at the same school) likely had experienced the same course
sign-up procedure that might lead them to expect something else. In other words, they
had IC'1owledge of the distribution of courses and hmv courses "fill up," based on
semesters prior. My first study also utilized only a single ordering of available options,
though I note that Studies 2 and 3 did not; similarly, the ordering used in Study 1 was
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random, and thus not manipulated to test a specific hypothesis, rather, it was
generated randomly.
Similarly, Study 3 extended Studies 1 and 2 by adding a second attribute of
"quality," or desirability of an option. However, two indicators (while better than one)
still vastly underrepresents the number of variables simultaneously determining "quality"
in everyday decision-making (Kramer & Hodges, in prep), and additional research will
also be necessary to flesh out the role of many quality indicators, which may be
correlated (either positively or negatively) depending on the choice context.
These paradigmatic issues may be partially responsible for some of the
inconsistencies in the findings for several hypotheses. The lack of support for Hypothesis
3 has already been discussed, but it must be noted that Hypotheses 1 and 2 also did not
find uniform support. Hypothesis lc predicted that more variable option sets would lead
to longer choice was significant only in the "low mean" condition in Studies 1 and 2. As
discussed in Study 1, above, the best reason for this is that ratings in the high-mean
occasionally "hit ceiling," or were in a sense the best possible outcome (for example, 30
minutes of free time and 0 minutes of math problems). The methodology in Study 3, in
which there was no "ceiling effect," nearly provides for the testing of this explanation,
but did not produce a significant result. However, Study 3 did not manipulate variability
of option sets directly, rather it did so by varying the actual distribution (to be either
variance), though the variance manipulation could have been either too weak to be
detected or the distribution shape could have rendered this effect undetectable. Future
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work might consider comparing two normal distributions (or two uniform
distributions) which have the same mean and different variances to see when and how
this effect appears, using an unbounded value metric (such as money gained or lost),
rather than the bounded one used in Studies 1 and 2 (number of minutes, range between 0
and 30).
Hypothesis Id also received mixed support across studies: It predicted that quality
metrics would become stronger predictors of choice as more options were viewed. This
was supported in Study 1 (for subjective quality and objective quality) and Study 3 (for
subjective quality and model-implied quality), but only marginal in Study 2 (for
subjective and for "raw" objective quality, but not for discounted objective quality). This
pattern of "weak results" also applies to Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that delayers
receive better outcomes: This effect was significant or marginal for both subjective and
objective quality in Study 1, and significant in Study 2 for objective quality (but not for
subjective quality), and marginal or non-significant in Study 3.
Some of these inconsistent results may well be due to the methodological
differences among studies. For example, in Study 1, a single distribution was used, so
effects dependent on delay were affected by the same order of options' qualities for each
participant, making these results much easier to detect across people. The fact that these
effects replicated only inconsistently could indicate that these effects depend on the
actual distribution of options seen b)t the decision-maker. T:his may be due to the
interaction between distribution learning and choice: As people learn the distribution,
they are effectively rejecting options. When people delay decisions to see more options,
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the first part of that delay may be to learn the distribution, but the latter part of the
delay may be to use that learned information to evaluate options in order to pick a
superior one: People may gain information about the distribution, and then at some point
begin evaluating choices relative to those they have already seen. Future research should
examine whether there is a "cutoff point" (or range) where the decision-maker has started
to feel comfortable choosing, perhaps by examining confidence in subjective ratings as
an additional variable. If such a point exists, it would also be interesting to explore
whether the relationship between delay (specifically during the learning period) is more
clearly related to quality of the chosen option.
Above research considerations aside, I also do not claim that the results in this
dissertation are sufficient to suggest delaying decision-making for any decision in any
context. For example, many decisional contexts carry sufficiently steep costs for waiting
that any delay (to see more options, to further deliberate, or even to blink an eye) may be
unacceptable. Similarly, while I have shown distributions of available options to have
been learned by those who delay choice, I have not undertaken any analysis of the
accuracy ofthis leaming. Some distributions may be inherently difficult to leam, while
other distributions may learned incorrectly: For example, if humans are used to dealing
with normal distributions, then distributions that appear to be normal but deviate in some
uncommon way (for example, having odd skew or kurtosis) may be incorrectly learned as
"normal," thus leading to improper judgment of the likelihood ofoptions falling in the
tails. In general, it is difficult to argue for or against delay in a general-case decision
based on the results in this thesis; rather, the utility of delay is likely to vary across
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decisional contexts. My results, rather, serve to motivate the question and to suggest
that delay is not an inherently bad strategy.
This set of studies also lacks some ecological validity in the realm of reality of the
quality of options: The number ofminutes used for free time was "real" in the sense that
participants received the option they chose in Studies 1 and 2, and the roommate choice
paradigm was "real-world" in the sense that the decision was designed to represent that
which participants may face in everyday life, but these vignettes may be too "cold" to
generalize very far from. For example, "personability" of a person one has just met is an
inherently visceral or emotional reaction to that person (the literature on person
perception is based largely on first-impression short meetings, see Ambady & Rosenthal,
1992, for a review); simply saying that it's "high" in a vignette may lead people to mis-
weight its worth relative to how they would weight it in an actual person-to-person
roommate interview with someone they would then rate at the same level.
Just as real-world decisions are multiattributive, the set of options available in
each distribution will also follow many distributions not tested in this thesis. Broadly, one
would expect that people would be best at learning (and choosing good options) when the
distribution of options is familiar to them; Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006) show a
similar effect linking real-world interactions with money to the well-known "value
function" that represents peoples' valuation of changes in value established in Kahneman
and familiarity with the distribution is very likely to be based on prior experience. Indeed,
most participants have some experience with choosing roommates or at least thinking
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about roommate choice. The fact that Study 3's participants were college students
(most of whom had likely had at least one randomly-assigned roommate as part of their
college experience) may have predisposed the participants to presume a certain
distribution of roommates, which mayor may not have been normal or uniform (the two
distributions used in Study 3). This presumption may have led participants to spend less
time learning the distribution at hand or to use their knowledge of an alternative
distribution in judging the relative worth of roommates: For example, if they believed
most roommates to be poor and thus the distribution to be positively skewed, a middle-
of-the-road (i.e., median) roommate presenting in the normal-distribution condition of
Study 3 may have been chosen prematurely. This could explain why participants did not
delay longer for the uniform distribution than for the normal distribution in the
roommate-choice study, even though there is evidence that higher variability of option
sets leads to greater delay in choosing (as shown in Study 1 and partially replicated in
Study 2). However, this may not be a fatal flaw for the theory, so much as my choice of
methods: Many real-world optimal stopping decisions are made in contexts in which the
decision-maker is not completely new to the task. Most purchasers of airline flights, for
example, are people who have purchased other airline flights in the past, and even the
businessman of the classic vignette was purported to be choosing a secretary in order to
replace (at least) one with whom he was already acquainted. Future work should consider
using contexts for which known distributions exist, or empirically determining these
distributions, for example, examining distributions of flight prices from one city to
another, and then examining optional stopping behavior in a hypothetical "flight choice"
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decision among individuals who purchased such a flight, or by systematically
evaluating the personability and financial stability of people who post to Craigslist
looking for somewhere to live and then using the observed distribution in a replication of
Study 3.
Indeed, if people are better-acquainted with some distributions rather than others,
then the extent to which studies utilizing normal (or uniform) distributions can be used to
illustrate the underlying processes of learning distributions is unclear. As we know from
introductory statistical literature, assuming that data follows a normal distribution (when
it doesn't) does not always lead to tragedy (c.f. Howell, 2008); this suggests that, even if
human decision makers naturally presume that the options offered to them come from a
non-normal distribution, presenting normally distributed options should still offer a
(tinted) window into the processes at work. Indeed, this sort of expected/actual
distribution mismatch could explain some of the weaker or more confusing effects
illustrated by my studies.
Another limitation has to do with the fact that the randomness of the options
shown to my participants may be inherently ecologically unsound, as very few sequences
of options available in real-world decisions are actually generated by random processes.
Even very hard-to-predict outcomes, such as airline prices or the stock market, are not
generated randomly, but rather are generated in a manner unknown to the human judge.
T,his is consistent \-vith the noted human inabilit)l to identif]T or generate random
sequences (c.f. Wagenaar, 1972) and the consistent search for patterns even in random
data (Wolford, Newman, Miller, & Wig, 2004), perhaps synergistically so (one could
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argue that all of science is a search for patterns among a chaos that we believe to
contain patterns). The human trouble coping with randomness (as well as other biases in
judgment) suggest that distributions that are unbalanced with regard to option quality
may also be unbalanced in terms of how (normatively) desirable learning the distribution
would be, how precisely people prefer to learn the distribution before feeling comfortable
choosing, how successfully people can learn the distribution, and how well they do with
their choice.
Such ecological invalidity might also explain the inconsistency of the
effectiveness of my "mean" manipulation in Study 2: In Study 1, the "low mean"
condition may not have been considered objectively "bad," while in Study 2, the within-
subjects manipulation may have led participants to view the "low mean" conditions as
objectively "bad" when they had seen the "high mean" condition previously (due to
random ordering of conditions within subjects, 82% of subjects would have seen one
"low mean" condition after at least one "high mean" condition. While two types of
distributions, normal and uniform, were examined in this paper, future research should
consider additional distributions or examine the frequency ofdistributions in de1ayed-
choice paradigms in everyday life, as well as distributions for which subjective quality
bears a nonlinear relationship to objective quality (e.g., money; Kahneman & Tversky,
1979).
An additional limitation to this work has to do with the discussion of "learning" a
distribution, or delaying "in order to" learn about a distribution of options. There is
consistent evidence that people do indeed delay-Hypothesis 1 shows just this. Further,
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there is consistent evidence that delaying leads to knowledge of the distribution-
Hypothesis ld (that quality is a stronger predictor of choice when participants have
delayed) and Hypothesis 2a (that subjective quality grows closer to the actual objective
quality of an option as participants view more options) support this. Hypotheses lc and
2e also provide concurrent evidence, as they show that delay behavior is based on the
distribution (or slope) of options observed. However, using the term "learning"
throughout this paper may suggest an intentionality that has not been directly tested. I
have not shown evidence that distribution learning is an active or conscious determinant
of delay, nor is there evidence that participants know the mean, variance, skew, or slope
of the options they have seen. Clearly, some sort oflearning does occur, as shown by the
results discussed above, but the conscious, intentional processes by which the learning
itself occurs, or why people believe themselves to be delaying, has not been addressed.
Future Work
As I have alluded to above, there are several ways to extend this work, involving
examination of additional distributions, additional choice frames, additional
modifications of the optimal stopping paradigm, and additional decision scenarios. First,
prior knowledge of a distribution should greatly affect the processes by which people
seek additional information. For example, when attempting to purchase an airplane ticket,
most people hold knowledge of how much tickets cost, as a function ofthe many
attributes (coach vs. first class, length of flight, number of stops, etc.) before they even
begin seeking options. One interesting extension of this work would be to examine how
these choices unfold from a distribution-learning perspective. Memory and recall of
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distributional information may take several forms, including recall of distribution-
level qualities (such as the mean and variance), best-case and worst-case scenarios (i.e.,
the range of the distribution, akin to Karlsson, Jus1in, and Olsson's 2008 discussion of
exemplars), or some other sentinel value.
Another extension of the current work could address the rate at which prior
distribution information goes stale: Even though distribution information may be
correctly recalled, some time may be taken to re-Iearn or re-confirm the distributional
qualities of a similar option set. Indeed, the question of how people apply distribution
information gained from one option set to others is an interesting future direction: for
example, translating a known distribution of airline prices from Eugene to San Francisco
to flights from Boston to Chicago. While the mean price will certainly differ, people may
presume that the variation around the mean would be similar, empowering them to make
decisions quicker. Further, are those who delay more initially able to make faster
decisions (delaying less) in a second or far-off decision because the information initially
gained remains salient? When multiple cues are present, do people learn their correlations
as well, building up cues that allow them to evaluate less information in the future such
as "direct flights are more expensive?"
Altering the optimal stopping paradigm used is also an important direction for
future research. As mentioned above, the current paradigm fails to capture how decision
delay functions when several options are simultaIleously available. A future study could
address this by adding and/or removing several options simultaneously in each step. For
example, in Study 3, this could be accomplished by suggesting that the participant should
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imagine interviewing several roommates today, after being shown each potential
roommate's personability and financial stability, and then note that some other
roommates (interviewed previously) had found places to live and withdrawn their
application. This would lead to several roommates being available at each decision point,
such that delaying choice would not necessarily (but instead, probabilistically) eliminate
any current option. Effectively, this would be a modification of Patalano and Wengrovitz'
(2007) paradigm, altered to use a variable distribution of qualities and likelihoods of
options becoming unavailable. This would allow the testing of several additional
hypotheses: For example, if delay did not increase in such a study (despite the fact that
good options would stick around), that would provide additional evidence that the
observed distribution is indeed being learned or somehow internalized.
Extending these methodologies to paradigms other than optimal stopping
problems or variations on them may also lead to greater knowledge about decision delay
and decision making in general. For example, when researchers have participants choose
one out of many options, they could consider qualities of the set of options as well as
pairwise comparisons. For example, researchers using Dhar's (1997) paradigm could
consider the variance and skew of his set of two superior and one inferior options, and
those using Botti and Iyengar's (1994) paradigm could consider the variance in quality of
the jams they have participants sample. It may well be that Dhar's conclusion of a
nreference reversal (for sunerior ontions versus waitinQ when another sunerior ontion is
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added) may be better explained as an example of more variable options sets engendering
delay. Similarly, Botti and Iyengar's conclusion that it is aversive to have "too much
145
choice" may also be better-explained by the theory that less-variable option sets lead
to less satisfaction and/or a more aversive decision process. Broadly speaking, this
research should lead researchers to question whether an assumption of "regularity," as
Corbin (1980) puts it, is ever appropriate: How exactly should a comparison of option A
to option B should be interpreted when option C is added to (or removed from) the
choice? Expecting this added context to be ignored in the name of "rationality" may not,
in fact, be rational.
Procrastination research can also be informed by the methods and results of this
paper. As discussed in "Implications," above, there is now a strong case to be made for
examining delay of action independently from an expectation (on the part of researchers
or participants) that delay will lead to worse outcomes. Further, even researchers of the
willful off-putting of actions by people who expect to suffer for their delay may be able
to fruitfully use the methods found in the current studies. Modeling a linear relationship
between delay and option quality in these studies did not tell the whole story: A positive
linear effect with a negative quadratic effect showed that some delay was beneficial,
although this benefit tapered off (and eventually became negative). This initial positive
effect of delay may be important in explaining the relationship between procrastination
and stress: Tice and Baumeister (1997) showed that procrastinators suffered less stress
while delaying action (and less overall), but much more stress when the deadlines hit.
Together, this suggests that the optimal strategy from a decision-making and health
perspective is not the "immediate action" as many procrastination researchers suggest,
but rather, an amount of delay appropriate to the decision context.
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Summary
I have provided evidence that people both desire distributional information when
making a decision among options (and will delay decisions while gaining this
information), and those who have such viewed such information learn it and use it-and
in some cases, obtain better outcomes. Though I failed to show any individual differences
in how these delay processes work, the results discussed do have some bearing on the
research and practice ofhuman decision-making, bridging conflicting models of
procrastination, at least in the realm of decision-making: Haste may indeed make waste,
but he who hesitates (too long) may also be lost.
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